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Many public health and safety education interventions have failed because 
practitioners did not apply effective methods of influence to alter individuals’ actions. 
Identification of successful methods has been complicated by the lack of a theory to 
describe the factors that cause individuals to perform recommended practices. 
This thesis investigates the methods that were responsible for success in 
individual-level public health and safety interventions. A comparative case study was 
conducted on a set of interventions that encouraged seat belt use, bicycle helmet wearing, 
and alcohol moderation. Each intervention was analyzed using a four-model approach 
encompassing rational choice, reasoned behavior, and both intuitive and reflective 
interpretations of behavioral economics in order to detect methods that might have 
influenced individuals to change their actions. Comparative analysis between case 
analyses permitted identification of the intervention methods that are correlated with 
successful health and safety programs in general. 
The social forces of injunctive pressure and public commitment were found to be 
correlated with effective programs of influence. This thesis concludes that future public 
health and safety education interventions may achieve success by leveraging peer 
pressure and public commitments to elicit compliance with desired practices. 
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The mission of public health and safety education is administered through 
interventions that attempt to influence individuals to perform beneficial practices. 
Interventions employ a variety of methods in their efforts to effect change within a 
number of health and safety fields. Fire and life safety education is one of the many fields 
that comprise public health and safety education. 
Smoke alarms are among the most important safety devices promoted by fire and 
life safety education. Despite the substantial safety benefit provided by smoke alarms, 
many individuals fail to properly maintain these devices.1 A multitude of fire and life 
safety education interventions have attempted to encourage smoke alarm installation and 
maintenance, but so far these attempts have proven unsuccessful.2 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem is that fire and life safety education practitioners do not know how to 
influence individuals to maintain smoke alarms or perform other recommended safety 
practices.3 This issue is not limited to fire and life safety education, as researchers in 
other fields of injury prevention are similarly unsure of the factors that cause individuals 
to perform safety actions.4 Until the factors that cause individuals to act in a safe manner 
are understood, successful intervention design will remain a mystery. 
                                                 
1 Marty Ahrens, Smoke Alarms in U.S. Home Fires (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection 
Association, 2014), 7, http://strategicfire.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ahrens-Smoke-Alarms-in-US-
Home-Fires-1.pdf. 
2 Lynne Warda, Milton Tenenbein, and Michael EK Moffatt, “House Fire Injury Prevention Update. 
Part II. A Review of the Effectiveness of Preventive Interventions,” Injury Prevention 5, no. 3 (1999): 217. 
3 N. J. Thompson, M. B. Waterman, and David A. Sleet, “Using Behavioral Science to Improve Fire 
Escape Behaviors in Response to a Smoke Alarm,” Journal of Burn Care & Research 25, no. 2 (2004): 
185. 
4 L. B. Trifiletti et al., “Behavioral and Social Sciences Theories and Models: Are They Used in 
Unintentional Injury Prevention Research?,” Health Education Research 20, no. 3 (2005): 298. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can we design successful individual-level interventions to improve public 
health and safety? 
D. ARGUMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
We must first understand the factors that cause individuals to perform health and 
safety practices before we can design successful individual-level interventions. Fire and 
life safety education research unfortunately does not provide sufficiently reliable data to 
investigate these factors.5 Analysis of existing research from other health and safety 
fields, however, may permit discovery of the factors that drive health and safety actions. 
This thesis performs a comparative case study of health and safety interventions 
that encouraged individuals to use seat belts, wear bicycle helmets, and moderate alcohol 
consumption. Each case is analyzed to identify the intervention methods and influential 
factors of individual action that are correlated with the outcome of that case. Because the 
determinant factors of health and safety actions have yet to be established, this thesis 
employs multiple models derived from the fields of rational choice, reasoned behavior, 
and two different interpretations of behavioral economics in an attempt to consider 
relevant routes by which intervention methods may influence individuals. Comparative 
analysis of the intervention methods associated with success in the specific cases drawn 
from these three health and safety fields may permit discovery of a set of common 
methods that are correlated with successful programs across multiple fields. 
E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this study permit several informative conclusions regarding the 
methods that can be used to influence individuals. Injunctive pressure is a highly 
effective tool for producing change, provided that individuals believe they are liable to be 
judged negatively if they do not perform desired actions. Public commitments are also a 
viable means of achieving at least a temporary improvement in health and safety, but 
                                                 
5 Van M. Ta et al., “Evaluated Community Fire Safety Interventions in the United States: A Review of 
Current Literature,” Journal of Community Health 31, no. 3 (2006): 195, doi:10.1007/s10900-005-9007-z. 
 xv 
individuals may have to be occasionally reminded of these commitments to maintain 
compliance. The impact of these two methods reveals the power that social forces possess 
to guide the actions of individuals. 
The findings of this comparative case study also inform conclusions about those 
methods that are not useful for improving individuals’ health and safety actions. The use 
of economic incentives is not a sustainable method for producing widespread change, as 
the number of individuals who would have to be perpetually rewarded would render the 
costs impractical. Another conclusion of the present research is that salient injury threats 
are incapable of influencing individuals. 
Achieving widespread change in individual-level health and safety is an ambitious 
and challenging goal. Through deliberate and targeted interventions, however, health and 
safety practitioners may be able to initiate a social reaction that spreads far beyond the 
limited reach of direct practitioner influence. 
Practitioners should mount targeted interventions that light a fire within the public 
for health and safety by crowd-sourcing injunctive pressure and public commitments. 
Limited, practitioner-implemented interventions could exert injunctive pressure and 
obtain public commitments from incentivized or volunteer peer agents, who would then 
be directed to pressure their neighbors, friends, and family to perform desired health or 
safety actions and secure pledges committing to those practices. Admittedly, any 
intervention of this type would initially influence only a relatively small number of 
individuals. By kindling a flame of civic engagement, however, the resulting chain 
reaction could propagate an exponential, public-driven improvement in health and safety. 
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The mission of public health and safety education is administered through 
interventions that attempt to influence individuals to perform beneficial practices. 
Interventions employ a variety of methods in their efforts to effect change within a 
number of health and safety fields. Fire and life safety education is one of the many fields 
that comprise public health and safety education. 
Fire and life safety education interventions are intended to teach civilians to 
prepare for their own safety against a wide variety of threats. The National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) describes the broad mission of fire and life safety 
education as “community fire and injury prevention programs designed to eliminate or 
mitigate situations that endanger lives, health, property, or the environment.”1 Fire and 
life safety education promotes responsible household habits such as safe cooking, space 
heater, candle, and cigarette use, smoke alarm installation and maintenance, family 
evacuation planning, civilian first aid training, and storage of disaster preparedness 
supplies such as food, water, and medicine. 
Smoke alarms are among the most important safety devices promoted by fire and 
life safety education. Possession of a working smoke alarm has been found to reduce the 
chance of dying in a fire by half.2 Without a functioning smoke alarm, many occupants 
have insufficient time to escape from a fire before conditions become untenable.3 
                                                 
1 National Fire Protection Association, “NFPA 1035: Standard on Fire and Life Safety Educator, 
Public Information Officer, Youth Firesetter Intervention Specialist and Youth Firesetter Program Manager 
Professional Qualifications” (National Fire Protection Association, 2015), http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-
standards/document-information-pages?mode=code&code=1035. 
2 Marty Ahrens, Smoke Alarms in U.S. Home Fires (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection 
Association, 2014), 10, http://strategicfire.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ahrens-Smoke-Alarms-in-US-
Home-Fires-1.pdf. 
3 Richard W. Bukowski et al., Performance of Home Smoke Alarms: Analysis of the Response of 
Several Available Technologies in Residential Fire Settings (Washington, DC: National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2007), 253, http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire07/art063.html. 
 2 
Despite the substantial safety benefit provided by smoke alarms, many individuals 
fail to properly maintain these devices.4 Although 96 percent of U.S. households report 
owning a smoke alarm, inspections of functionality indicate that only an estimated 77 
percent of U.S. households have at least one working smoke alarm.5 The percentage of 
U.S. households with sufficient smoke alarm protection is likely even lower, as current 
NFPA guidelines recommend a smoke alarm in every room used for sleeping, an 
additional smoke alarm outside of every sleeping area, and at least one smoke alarm on 
each level of a home.6 
Several occupant actions are required in order to ensure adequate smoke alarm 
protection. Residents must install the proper number of smoke alarms in recommended 
locations, understand the characteristics of different smoke alarm detection technologies, 
test alarms every month, ensure that power is maintained to smoke alarms, and refrain 
from disconnecting smoke alarms when activated by causes other than fire.7 Some 
experts have argued that new regulations and smoke alarm technologies will render 
occupant participation in smoke alarm installation and maintenance unnecessary.8 The 
human element evident in the aforementioned activities, however, suggests that occupant 
participation will remain essential for the foreseeable future. 
A multitude of fire and life safety education interventions have attempted to 
encourage smoke alarm installation and maintenance, but so far these attempts have 
proven unsuccessful.9 Mass media, educational campaigns, and door-to-door canvassing 
have all been used to provide messages encouraging smoke alarm usage.10 Non-
                                                 
4 Ahrens, Smoke Alarms in U.S. Home Fires, 7. 
5 Ibid. 
6 National Fire Protection Association, “NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code” (National 
Fire Protection Association, 2013), http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/document-information-
pages?mode=code&code=72. 
7 N. J. Thompson, M. B. Waterman, and David A. Sleet, “Using Behavioral Science to Improve Fire 
Escape Behaviors in Response to a Smoke Alarm,” Journal of Burn Care & Research 25, no. 2 (2004): 
180. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Lynne Warda, Milton Tenenbein, and Michael EK Moffatt, “House Fire Injury Prevention Update. 
Part II. A Review of the Effectiveness of Preventive Interventions,” Injury Prevention 5, no. 3 (1999): 217. 
10 Ibid. 
 3 
randomized studies of smoke alarm programs administered via mass media outlets such 
as advertising, direct mailings, and brochure distribution have not produced an increase in 
smoke alarm ownership.11 While several studies of home, school, and community 
educational programs have reported positive effects, randomized and blinded studies of 
similar programs have not found a change in smoke alarm protection, indicating that the 
apparent gains in non-randomized and non-blinded studies may be the result of researcher 
biases.12 Door to door smoke alarm installation programs provide temporary protection 
but are unable to encourage residents to maintain these devices, as subsequent inspections 
find many of these smoke alarms inactive with dead or missing batteries, disabled due to 
nuisance alarms, or vandalized.13 An intervention that installed smoke alarms containing 
10-year lithium batteries in high-risk households in Dallas, Texas experienced similar 
maintenance issues, finding 91.8 percent of smoke alarms functional two years post 
installation, with functionality rates dropping to 68 percent after four years, 35.8 percent 
after 6 years, 27.3 percent after 8 years, and 19.9 percent after 10 years.14 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem is that fire and life safety education practitioners do not know how to 
influence individuals to maintain smoke alarms or perform other recommended safety 
practices.15 This is not surprising, given the unreliable nature of research in this field. 
Studies of individual-level fire and life safety education programs have been criticized for 
inconsistent design or performance measures, lack of randomness or controls, and 
inadequate sample size or follow-up time.,1617 An absence of theory has been noted as a 
                                                 
11 Carolyn DiGuiseppi, Cynthia W Goss, and Julian PT Higgins, “Interventions for Promoting Smoke 
Alarm Ownership and Function,” Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, no. 2 (2001): 7, doi:10.1002/
14651858.CD002246. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Warda, Tenenbein, and Moffatt, “House Fire Injury Prevention Update. Part II. A Review of the 
Effectiveness of Preventive Interventions,” 224. 
14 G. R. Istre et al., “Preventing Deaths and Injuries from House Fires: An Outcome Evaluation of a 
Community-Based Smoke Alarm Installation Programme,” Injury Prevention 20, no. 2 (2014): 101. 
15 Thompson, Waterman, and Sleet, “Using Behavioral Science to Improve Fire Escape Behaviors in 
Response to a Smoke Alarm,” 185. 
16 Warda, Tenenbein, and Moffatt, “House Fire Injury Prevention Update. Part II. A Review of the 
Effectiveness of Preventive Interventions,” 223. 
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inadequate sample size or follow-up time.,1617 An absence of theory has been noted as a 
common shortcoming among smoke alarm interventions and literature.18 The lack of 
rigor in fire and life safety education is further demonstrated by the development and 
promotion of age priorities that have not been adequately justified.19 Without reliable 
data or established theory to explain individuals’ actions, it is unclear how a successful 
fire and life safety education intervention should be designed. 
Researchers in other fields of injury prevention are similarly unsure of the factors 
that cause individuals to perform safety actions.20 Although injury prevention has begun 
to adopt established health behavior theories and models in the development, 
implementation, and evaluation of interventions, these uses have failed to test if the 
models imported from health research are applicable to injury problems.21 Until the 
factors that cause individuals to act in a safe manner are understood, successful 
intervention design will remain a mystery. 
Discovering how to influence individual actions appears necessary in order to 
improve health and safety. An analysis of the decreasing repercussions of tobacco use 
and motor vehicle crashes observed over the past several decades asserts that these 
significant health and safety improvements were ultimately achieved as a result of 
legislative and policy solutions, driven by changing social attitudes that were themselves 
supported and influenced by individual-level interventions.22 While this analysis 
identifies individual-level interventions as the causal factors that precipitate social change 
                                                 
16 Warda, Tenenbein, and Moffatt, “House Fire Injury Prevention Update. Part II. A Review of the 
Effectiveness of Preventive Interventions,” 223. 
17 Van M. Ta et al., “Evaluated Community Fire Safety Interventions in the United States: A Review 
of Current Literature,” Journal of Community Health 31, no. 3 (2006): 195, doi:10.1007/s10900-005-9007-
z. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Timothy McNamara, “Questioning Risk-Based Fire and Life Safety Education Age Priorities,” 
Injury Prevention, 2016, doi:10.1136/injuryprev-2016-042014. 
20 L. B. Trifiletti et al., “Behavioral and Social Sciences Theories and Models: Are They Used in 
Unintentional Injury Prevention Research?,” Health Education Research 20, no. 3 (2005): 298. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Andrea C. Gielen and Lawrence W. Green, “The Impact of Policy, Environmental, and Educational 
Interventions A Synthesis of the Evidence From Two Public Health Success Stories,” Health Education & 
Behavior 42, no. 1 suppl (2015): 20S–34S. 
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to effect widespread health and safety improvement, the factors necessary to produce the 
successful individual-level interventions that serve as catalysts at the beginning of this 
causal chain remain unknown. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can we design successful individual-level interventions to improve public 
health and safety? 
D. ARGUMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
We must first understand the factors that cause individuals to perform health and 
safety practices before we can design successful individual-level interventions. Fire and 
life safety education research unfortunately does not provide sufficiently reliable data to 
investigate these factors.23 The wider body of injury prevention, however, may contain 
studies with more thorough documentation and rigorous evaluation. Searching for such 
studies in the existing research of several health and safety fields could permit discovery 
of the factors that drive health and safety actions. 
This thesis will perform a comparative case study of health and safety 
interventions that encouraged individuals to use seat belts, wear bicycle helmets, and 
moderate alcohol consumption. Each case will be analyzed to identify the intervention 
methods employed and the factors of individual action that were influenced by those 
methods to achieve the observed program outcome. Because the determinant factors of 
health and safety actions have yet to be established, this thesis will employ multiple 
models derived from the fields of rational choice, reasoned behavior, and two different 
interpretations of behavioral economics in an attempt to consider relevant routes by 
which intervention methods may influence individuals. Comparative analysis of the 
intervention methods associated with success in the specific cases drawn from these three 
health and safety fields could permit discovery of a set of common methods that are 
correlated with successful programs across multiple fields. 
                                                 
23 Ta et al., “Evaluated Community Fire Safety Interventions in the United States: A Review of 
Current Literature,” 195. 
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E. GOAL 
If a set of general methods correlated with successful health and safety 
interventions can be identified, these factors could be applied to design interventions in 
any related field. Fire and life safety education would benefit by using these lessons 
learned to create better interventions for increasing smoke alarm maintenance, instilling 
safe household kitchen and heating practices, and encouraging family evacuation 
planning. Pedestrian, cyclist, and motorist safety could be enhanced by a better 
understanding of the intervention methods that effect change. Knowledge of these factors 
would also benefit fields beyond traditional injury prevention. 
The homeland security implications of these findings would be significant, 
enabling practitioners to guide individuals’ actions to enhance public safety and mitigate 
the threats of terrorism and disaster. Interventions could be implemented to make 
members of the public more alert, increasing the likelihood that suspicious activity would 
be detected and reported.24 Teaching civilians to locate and note secondary exits upon 
entering an unfamiliar space might allow some would-be victims to escape from an active 
shooter attack.25 Encouraging individuals to prepare disaster kits containing food, water, 
and medicine could make communities more resilient during natural disaster, at the same 
time freeing first responders so they can mitigate the actual emergency, rather than use 
these resources to provide basic supplies to an unprepared citizenry.26 With an increased 
ability to influence individuals, both homeland security and general health and safety 
could be improved. Although this thesis only purports to identify intervention methods 
that are correlated with successful public health and safety programs, future research 
could test and establish the causality of these relationships. 
                                                 
24 Stephen Flynn, “Recalibrating Homeland Security: Mobilizing American Society to Prepare for 
Disaster,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 134. 
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond” (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.), 4, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-how-to-
respond-508.pdf. 
26 Flynn, “Recalibrating Homeland Security,” 137. 
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F. ORGANIZATION  
This thesis consists of six chapters. The next chapter, II, conducts a literature 
review of the relevant research on behavior and decision making. Chapter III defines the 
methodology that will guide the comparative case study of seat belt, bicycle helmet, and 
alcohol interventions. Chapter IV analyzes selected studies to identify the set of 
intervention methods used in each case. Chapter V then performs a comparative analysis 
across these cases to infer which methods are correlated with the design of successful 
health and safety interventions in general. Chapter VI reports the findings of these 
analyses, draws conclusions based upon these findings, and makes recommendations to 
improve public health and safety interventions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature on rational choice, reasoned behavior, and 
behavioral economics to present four interpretations of the factors that determine 
individual-level actions. The first two sections proceed in a straightforward manner, each 
suggesting a single model of individual action: rational choice describes how individuals 
make decisions, while reasoned behavior explains why individuals perform observed 
behaviors. The third section, which examines behavioral economics, is more involved 
and yields two models, one behavioral and one based on decision making, each derived 
from different interpretations of this field. A brief summary follows these three sections 
to conclude the literature review. 
A. RATIONAL CHOICE 
Rational theories of decision making attempt to predict which choice an 
individual will select from a set of available options. Central to these theories are the 
assumptions that individuals have complete information regarding all possible choices, 
and that individuals will always decide between alternatives in a rational manner.27 
Rationality here means that individuals are capable of using their complete information to 
calculate the optimal choice among all options, and that individuals will then select this 
option.28 In short, rational choice theories claim that individuals will always correctly 
decide to do whatever is in their own best interest. 
Rational decision making has changed over the centuries. The field has been 
developed by extrapolating from a set of assumptions and then testing to see how well the 
proposed theories fit known data.29 The earliest incarnations of rational decision making 
were predicated on the assumption of riskless choice, whereby omniscient individuals 
would know with certainty the utility that they would derive from each option.30 Under 
                                                 





these conditions, individuals would simply select whatever choice provided the 
maximum utility.31 
Current theories of rational decision making now assume that individuals 
maximize for expected utility when selecting the optimal choice from a set of options. 
This change was implemented to account for decisions under risk, whereby the outcomes 
associated with each choice are not certain, but can instead be predicted with a known 
probability.32 The expected utility of a choice can be computed by enumerating all 
possible outcomes for that choice, multiplying the probability of each outcome by its 
utility, and then summing all of the outcome probability-utility products for that choice.33 
Because of the rationality assumption, it is expected that individuals will be capable of 
subconsciously and correctly calculating these expected utilities, and that they will then 
always select the choice that optimizes expected utility.34 Therefore, according to 
contemporary rational decision making theories, individuals are aware of the probability 
of all possible outcomes, and will always select the choice that offers the greatest 
expected utility. 
Rational choice is not universally accepted as a model of decision making. Critics 
of rational choice argue that the assumptions of rational calculation are implausible and 
contradict observation of actual human choices.35 Studies of actual human decision 
making suggest that individuals are incapable of the probabilistic optimization 
calculations required by Expected Utility Theory.36 In responding to these critics, 
proponents of rational choice assert that their theories are normative in that they identify 
optimal choice, and also claim that rational choice correctly predicts individuals’ 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 382. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gerd Gigerenzer, “Decision Making: Nonrational Theories,” in International Encyclopedia of the 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes, vol. 5 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001), 3305. 
34 Edwards, “The Theory of Decision Making,” 392. 
35 Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
69, no. 1 (February 1955): 104, doi:10.2307/1884852. 
36 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 
Science 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1130. 
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decisions even if these theories do not accurately describe the processes that lead to those 
choices.37 
B. REASONED BEHAVIOR 
Reasoned models of behavior seek to predict whether or not an individual will 
perform a single behavior in isolation. A behavior is defined by four components: it is an 
action, performed on a target, in a specific context, at a given time.38 Human behaviors 
are considered to be the reasoned products of an individual’s beliefs regarding a constant 
set of determinant factors that contribute to the performance of each behavior.39 
Reasoned models of behavior assume that individuals always have an innate 
understanding of their own beliefs regarding every causal factor for each behavior.40 It is 
thought that an individual’s performance of a particular behavior results from a 
subconscious consideration of the strength of his or her beliefs about every determinant 
factor that influences that behavior.41 Some theories purport to identify the causal factors 
that directly produce a specific behavior, while others describe the factors that generate 
intent to perform a behavior.42 
Numerous reasoned theories have been advanced to explain human behavior. 
Prominent models in health research include the Health Belief Model, Social Cognitive 
Theory, and the Theory of Reasoned Action.43 An early attempt to synthesize these 
models, known as the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), defines three distinct, causal 
                                                 
37 Gigerenzer, “Decision Making,” 3305. 
38 Martin Fishbein, “The Role of Theory in HIV Prevention,” AIDS Care 12, no. 3 (2000): 274. 
39 Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, “The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior,” in The Handbook of 
Attitudes, ed. Dolores Albarracín, Blair Johnson, and Mark Zanna (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2005), 193. 
40 Ibid., 194. 
41 Ibid., 195. 
42 Thomas L. Webb and Paschal Sheeran, “Does Changing Behavioral Intentions Engender Behavior 
Change? A Meta-Analysis of the Experimental Evidence,” Psychological Bulletin 132, no. 2 (2006): 250–
51, doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.249. 
43 Martin Fishbein et al., “The Role of Theory in Developing Effective Antidrug Public Service 
Announcements,” in Mass Media and Drug Prevention Class and Contemporary Theories and Research, 
ed. William Crano and Michael Burgoon (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 90. 
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factors that contribute to intent to perform a behavior.44 Those factors are attitude toward 
the behavior resulting from a cost-benefit analysis, perceived norms of acceptable social 
behavior and perceptions of important referent’s opinions about the behavior, and 
perceived self-efficacy to enact the behavior.45 It is believed that the relative importance 
of these three factors is different for each population-behavior pair.46 The TPB also 
proposes that individuals hold personal beliefs regarding each of the three determinant 
factors for each behavior.47 An individual’s intent to perform a behavior is produced by 
the combined strength of his or her beliefs about each determinant factor, with the 
contribution of each belief modified by the relative weight of the associated causal 
factor.48 The TPB assumes that this review and calculation of belief strengths and the 
importance of each determinant factor occurs subconsciously, and precedes every 
behavioral impulse that a person may have.49 
The Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction (IMBP) attempts to provide a 
generalized model that encompasses all relevant factors identified by previous behavioral 
models to predict actual behavior. The IMBP extends the Theory of Planned Behavior by 
asserting that the three necessary and sufficient factors for performance of a behavior are 
the TPB’s intent, which is comprised of attitude, subjective norms and self-efficacy, 
along with requisite skills and an absence of environmental barriers.50 By adding this 
additional layer to the model, the IMBP describes a model of observed human behavior, 
rather than just intent. 
Proponents of the IMBP assert that this reasoned model can be used to predict and 
even change human behavior. This is accomplished by conducting surveys among the 
                                                 
44 Ajzen and Fishbein, “The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior,” 194. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Fishbein et al., “The Role of Theory in Developing Effective Antidrug Public Service 
Announcements,” 92. 
47 Ajzen and Fishbein, “The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior,” 194. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 195. 
50 Fishbein et al., “The Role of Theory in Developing Effective Antidrug Public Service 
Announcements,” 92. 
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target population to learn about their abilities, beliefs, and intentions regarding the 
desired behavior.51 If individuals lack the necessary skills or are faced with 
environmental barriers that prevent a desired behavior, then behavioral prediction and 
change will depend upon those factors.52 When skills and environmental barriers are not 
a problem, however, then behavioral prediction and change are accomplished through 
intention.53 
Prediction and change of behavioral intent under the IMBP requires quantification 
of the relative importance of the three determinant factors that contribute to a 
population’s intent to perform the behavior under study. To identify these weights, 
surveys must assess the strength of individual’s beliefs regarding each of the determinant 
intentional factors (attitudes, subjective norms, and self-efficacy), and also record 
whether or not the individual has performed or intends to perform the behavior.54 This 
data is then analyzed to discover how strongly each of the three determinant factors is 
correlated with actual or intended behavior.55 The IMBP then assumes that these 
correlational relationships represent three causal chains that contribute to and directly 
determine the likelihood that an individual will intend to perform a behavior.56 
Once the extent to which attitudes, subjective norms, and self-efficacy are 
correlated with the behavior for a population are known, prediction on the individual 
level can then be accomplished by examining the strength of a single subject’s beliefs 
regarding these three factors, modified by the correlational weight of each factor to 
determine the likelihood. Advocates for the IMBP suggest that successful behavior 
change programs can be created by first applying the IMBP to identify the dominant 
                                                 
51 Martin Fishbein and Marco C. Yzer, “Using Theory to Design Effective Health Behavior 
Interventions,” Communication Theory 13, no. 2 (2003): 168. 
52 Fishbein et al., “The Role of Theory in Developing Effective Antidrug Public Service 
Announcements,” 92. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Fishbein and Yzer, “Using Theory to Design Effective Health Behavior Interventions,” 169. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ajzen and Fishbein, “The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior,” 195. 
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factors that cause a population to perform a particular behavior, and then designing 
interventions that influence individuals’ beliefs regarding those dominant causal factors. 
Although the literature contains many studies that report evidence in support of 
the IMBP and other reasoned, intention-based theories as predictors of actual behavior, 
only a small number of these studies may offer reliable results. A meta-analysis of almost 
two hundred studies using the Theory of Planned Behavior did find a significant 
association between intention and behavior.57 The significance of this result is reduced, 
however, because the studies analyzed in this meta-analysis lacked controls and were 
correlational in nature, thereby unable to establish causation.58 The bulk of these studies 
employed cross-sectional designs that did not assess an individual’s intentions and 
behaviors at different points in time, which allows multiple possible explanations for the 
correlation between intention and behavior; while proponents of the IMBP could suggest 
that the intention-behavior correlation occurred because intention caused behavior, an 
equally valid explanation could argue that individual’s self-reported intentions were 
produced by and followed from their behaviors.59 
Even where longitudinal studies are employed, the possibility still exists that a 
third unknown variable is responsible for causing the apparent association between intent 
and behavior.60 A different meta-analysis of reasoned behavior-based interventions 
presents more reliable results by limiting study selection to longitudinal, experimental 
designs.61 By assessing an individual’s intentions and actions before and after the 
intervention, and by featuring a control group that did not receive the treatment, these 
studies provide more convincing evidence that “a medium-to-large change in intention 
leads to a small-to-medium change in behavior.”62 It is important to note, however, that 
despite the presence of a control group, differences compared to the experimental group 
                                                 
57 Christopher J. Armitage and Mark Conner, “Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A Meta-
Analytic Review,” The British Journal of Social Psychology 40 (2001): 485. 
58 Webb and Sheeran, “Does Changing Behavioral Intentions Engender Behavior Change?,” 251. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 253. 
62 Ibid., 249. 
 15 
could still be caused by a third, unknown variable, rather than by the intervention that 
was the focus of the study.63 
C. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
Behavioral economics incorporates findings from psychology in order to describe 
the underlying processes of individual action.64 The psychological concepts of bounded 
rationality and Dual System Theory are core aspects of behavioral economics that are 
explored by the first two subsections in the review of this field.65 The third subsection 
introduces the source of disagreement within behavioral economics, while the fourth and 
fifth subsections examine the competing views of the heuristics and biases program and 
the fast and frugal heuristics program in detail.66 The final subsection in this review of 
behavioral economics describes choice architecture, a collection of methods that 
influence individuals by leveraging heuristics described by the two different 
interpretations of behavioral economics. 
1. Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality asserts that humans have finite cognitive abilities and must 
therefore use simplified methods when making decisions or contemplating behaviors.67 
This argument was first advanced by Simon as a criticism of classical economics’ 
rationality provision that assumes humans possess unlimited time and infinite 
computational ability to examine all options and calculate expected probability in order to 
optimize choice selection when making decisions.68 Instead of maximizing every choice 
as in rational decision making, behavioral economics proposes that boundedly rational 
humans simplify the decision making process by using heuristics and shortcuts that use 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 260. 
64 Alain Samson, ed., “The Behavioral Economics Guide 2015 (with an Introduction by Dan Ariely),” 
2015, 1, http://www.behavioraleconomics.com/BEGuide2015.pdf. 
65 Alain Samson, ed., “The Behavioral Economics Guide 2016 (with an Introduction by Gerd 
Gigerenzer),” 2016, 102–6, http://www.behavioraleconomics.com/BEGuide2016.pdf. 
66 Ibid., 12. 
67 Herbert A. Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,” Psychological Review 
63, no. 2 (1956): 129–38. 
68 Ibid., 129. 
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only a subset of the available data in order to achieve satisfactory, rather than optimal, 
results.69 
The vocabulary of behavioral economics contains duplications and conflicts. 
Theories that incorporate bounded rationality are also known as nonrational theories due 
to their rejection of the assumptions of classic rational theories.70 Unfortunately, 
confusion has been introduced by some scholars who use the term bounded rationality to 
refer to rational theories of optimization under constraint.71 For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, both bounded rationality and nonrationality will describe the view of 
humans having finite time and cognitive abilities, whose decisions and behaviors are 
produced by heuristic shortcuts. 
2. Dual System Theory 
Dual System Theory describes the function of the human mind as if it were 
comprised of two distinct systems. System 1 provides rapid, automatic, intuitive, and 
involuntary responses to stimuli in the environment, while system 2 is responsible for 
deliberate and intentional thought.72 System 1 is believed to instigate most behaviors and 
cognitive processes, while system 2 will sometimes be aroused to monitor and possibly 
even overrule system 1.73 Most human behaviors may be enacted either automatically by 
system 1, or deliberately by system 2.74 Reflective and deliberate thought, however, is 
only performed by system 2.75 Good moods, time pressure, and states of mental 
occupation increase the likelihood that future behaviors will remain within the purview of 
                                                 
69 Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier, “Heuristic Decision Making,” Annual Review of 
Psychology 62, no. 1 (2011): 457. 
70 Gigerenzer, “Decision Making,” 3304. 
71 Gerd Gigerenzer, “The Adaptive Toolbox,” in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, ed. G 
Gigerenzer and R Selten (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 38. 
72 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), Kindle 
Edition, location 271. 
73 Alain Samson and Benjamin G. Voyer, “Two Minds, Three Ways: Dual System and Dual Process 
Models in Consumer Psychology,” AMS Review 2, no. 2 (2012): 54. 
74 Pelle Guldborg Hansen and Andreas Maaloe Jespersen, “Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice: A 
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European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2013, 13. 
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system 1.76 System 2 tends to be activated by foul moods, decisions of high personal 
significance, and decisions that will elicit social judgments.77 System 1 always has a 
significant influence on decisions and behaviors even when system 2 is activated, 
because system 2 is only able to operate on the perceptions that have been provided to it 
by system 1’s intuitive responses to stimuli in the environment.78 The inclusion of the 
automatic and involuntary system 1 in Dual System Theory is a significant departure 
from rational decision making theories and models of reasoned behavior, which assume 
that all human choices and behaviors are the product of deliberative thought processes.79  
3. Disagreement within Behavioral Economics 
Study of behavioral economics is divided into two camps, differentiated by their 
standard for rationality as well as their interpretation of heuristics.80 The heuristics and 
biases research conducted by Tversky and Kahneman holds classical economics’ selfish 
and maximizing rationality as the ideal norm, and views heuristics as error-prone 
shortcuts that prevent individuals from achieving rationality.81 The fast and frugal 
heuristics program championed by Gigerenzer, on the other hand, eschews the 
maximizing standard asserted by classic rationality and instead considers heuristics to be 
value-neutral simplification strategies that help individuals succeed in tasks that are 
computationally impossible for humans to optimize.82 
4. The Heuristics and Biases Program 
Early research on behavioral economics conducted by the heuristics and biases 
program focused on establishing evidence to prove that the judgments and evaluations 
                                                 
76 Samson and Voyer, “Two Minds, Three Ways,” 54. 
77 Ibid., 59. 
78 Hansen and Jespersen, “Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice,” 14. 
79 Ibid., 27. 
80 Ralph Hertwig and Stefan Herzog, “Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Tools of Social Rationality,” Social 
Cognition 27, no. 5 (2009): 668. 
81 Ibid. 
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that individuals make are the product of intuitive heuristics.83 These studies demonstrated 
the existence of numerous situations where individual’s judgments did not match 
classical economics’ predictions of rational and reasoned judgments produced by 
optimizing calculations.84 Instead, judgments were shown to be produced by simplified, 
intuitive heuristics that sometimes caused large, predictable errors.85 Although Dual 
System Theory had yet to be formalized and integrated into the study of behavioral 
economics, these initial explanations of intuitive judgments aligned with the eventual 
development of Dual System Theory, which was ultimately integrated into these 
descriptions of judgmental heuristics.86 
The heuristics and biases program views heuristics in a negative light, considering 
them to be biases that introduce errors.87 This view preserves the normative perspective 
of classical rationality, considering any observed deviation from rational ideals to be an 
error.88 According to this branch of psychology, heuristics occur only within the intuitive 
system 1.89 It is these automatic heuristics of system 1 that are then responsible for 
producing inaccurate perceptions which then cause errors in judgment when the 
deliberate and rational-like system 2 makes decisions based on this flawed information.90 
Although the reflective system 2 is sometimes capable of monitoring and correcting for 
errors in system 1 intuitions, system 2 is not always successful.91 The predictable errors 
                                                 
83 Thomas Gilovich and Dale Griffin, “Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now,” in Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 
84 Ibid., 4. 
85 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 1124. 
86 Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” The 
American Economic Review 93, no. 5 (2003): 1450. 
87 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 1131. 
88 Hertwig and Herzog, “Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Tools of Social Rationality,” 668. 
89 Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, “Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment,” in Models of 
a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A. Simon, ed. Mie Augier and James March (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2004), 413. 
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introduced by intuitive heuristics prevent humans from achieving the optimal decisions 
prescribed by rational models.92 
Several general, intuitive heuristics have been identified that purport to explain 
observed human behaviors. Representativeness, availability, and anchoring are three 
heuristics initially identified by the heuristics and biases program.93 The 
representativeness heuristic describes how individuals typically judge the probability of 
an event or action belonging to a class by the degree to which the event or action under 
consideration resembles the class stereotype, despite the ready availability of information 
indicating actual probability.94 Under the availability heuristic, events are considered to 
be more likely or weighted more heavily when examples come more readily to the 
individual’s mind.95 The ease at which an event or consideration comes to mind is 
determined by its salience, which can be influenced by temporal factors and personal 
relevance.96 The anchoring heuristic explains how an individual’s intuitive judgment of 
the value of an event or action is strongly affected by an unconsciously produced starting 
reference point.97 Research on the framing effect demonstrated how an individual’s 
intuitive judgments can be reliably influenced by manipulating the starting reference 
point that they will unconsciously use.98 A manipulation as simple as asking study 
participants to write the last two digits of their social security number on a piece of paper 
produced a reference point anchor that then significantly affected the price they would be 
willing to pay for various products.99 Priming is a term that can also be used to describe 
the framing effect caused by the anchoring heuristic.100 The affect heuristic, another 
general heuristic defined subsequent to the heuristics and biases program, is responsible 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 1131. 
94 Ibid., 1124. 
95 Ibid., 1127. 
96 Ibid. 
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for producing an automatic positive or negative feeling in response to stimuli in the 
environment.101 Optimism bias is yet another heuristic that influences behavior by 
causing individuals to underestimate the likelihood that anything bad will happen to them 
or those that they know.102 
While investigating these biases, the heuristics and biases program developed 
Prospect Theory, which provided an important insight into how real humans weight gains 
and losses.103 According to prospect theory, individuals weight losses more heavily than 
gains.104 This served to further discredit classical rationality, which would assume that 
rational humans would optimize for value, regardless of whether the value change was 
positive or negative relative to zero.105 
Understanding of loss aversion described by Prospect Theory led to the discovery 
of the endowment effect and the status quo bias.106 The endowment effect was proposed 
as an explanation for why individuals value items that they own more highly than items 
they do not, and is thought to be produced by an aversion to the loss produced by giving 
up the item or discontinuing the behavior, rather than an actual change in judged value of 
that object or behavior.107 The status quo bias is also motivated by loss aversion, where 
individuals continue to perform the same action or acquiesce to defaults because the 
benefits lost by switching from a previous action or default are weighted more heavily 
than the potential gains of a new action or behavior.108 
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Social heuristics are also believed to exert a powerful influence on judgments. 
These intuitive heuristics occur in response to cues that are detected automatically from 
the observed behaviors of others. The ability of animals to intuitively detect predators and 
court mates is an example of an automatic social heuristic used to interpret and respond 
to the intentions of others.109 Herding is a social heuristic that is seen in humans when 
individuals intuitively conform to what others are doing or are perceived to value.110 
Public commitment to an individual’s self-image also exerts a powerful social force that 
influences individuals to maintain consistency with their self-characterizations.111 
5. The Fast and Frugal Heuristics Program 
The fast and frugal heuristics interpretation of behavioral economics describes 
heuristic decision making strategies that individuals use when selecting from a set of 
alternatives.112 Heuristics are considered to be value-neutral simplifying methods that 
can be employed by both the intuitive and reflective systems of the mind.113 Although 
proponents of the heuristics and biases program consider heuristics to be error-prone 
shortcuts of intuitive judgment that compromise the decisions of reflective thought, 
supporters of fast and frugal heuristics argue instead that humans elect to use heuristics as 
deliberate decision making strategies because they can save effort and produce better 
results than optimizing methods by taking advantage of the structure of the 
environment.114 Under this view, the optimizing decision making prescribed by classical 
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rationality is disregarded as unachievable and irrelevant.115 Heuristics here are not 
failures of rationality; rather, they are domain-specific, meaning that they will be reliable 
and accurate when used in an appropriate, ecologically rational context.116 
A heuristic is considered to be ecologically rational if it is well adapted to the 
specific environment where it is used.117 This notion of context-dependence is a 
significant component of Simon’s original argument for bounded rationality, whereby 
both the cues that exist within an environment and the cognitive abilities of the humans 
who make decisions within these domains must be understood in order to comprehend 
human decisions.118 Proponents of the neutral view of behavioral economics claim that 
ecologically appropriate heuristics are more realistic than rational theories and can 
produce results as good as or better than optimizing strategies.119 Gigerenzer even opines 
that the term ‘cognitive limitations’ should not be used in describing bounded rationality, 
as it implies an inferiority relative to the perfect ideal presented by rationalism–rather, he 
suggests that the phrase cognitive abilities should be used instead to describe the realistic 
capabilities of humans without apology.120 
Nonrational decision making heuristics can be described as a set of simplified 
search, stopping, and decision rules.121 Search rules govern the order in which options 
are considered from a set of alternatives, and include such methods as random order, 
ordered search according to a particular attribute, and ordering prioritization by imitation 
of what other individuals do.122 Stopping rules determine which alternatives enumerated 
by the search process should be evaluated for possible selection.123 A simple stopping 
rule proposed by the satisficing heuristic stops search as soon as an alternative is found 
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that meets or exceeds a particular aspiration level.124 More involved stopping rules 
continue to examine alternatives until two alternatives are found that can be differentiated 
based upon some common attribute cue.125 Not all stopping decisions are conscious and 
reflective, however, as emotions such as love can also cause search to stop.126 Decision 
rules are then used to decide if the alternative under consideration should be selected.127 
These three rules are used in two different classes of nonrational decision making 
heuristics described by the fast and frugal heuristics program: one class is used to parse 
through a large or infinite number of available alternatives until an acceptable choice is 
found, the other class of heuristics is used to decide between a limited and known set of 
alternatives on the basis of a large or infinite number of potential attributes.128 
a. Aspiration-Level Theories for Large Sets of Alternatives 
Aspiration-level theories describe how individuals make decisions when 
presented with a large or infinite set of possible alternatives. In these situations, 
individuals search through the available alternatives in some order, considering one 
option at a time.129 The search order might be random, or it could be influenced by social 
imitation.130 As soon as one option is found that meets or exceeds a pre-determined 
(though potentially variable) aspiration level, search is stopped and the aspiration-
satisfying choice is selected.131 This notion of satisficing upon reaching an aspiration 
level was presented by Herbert Simon alongside his initial argument for bounded 
rationality, to offer an alternate and far simpler explanation for decision making 
compared to the optimizing strategies described by rational choice models.132 
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b. Decision Making Heuristics for Limited and Known Alternatives 
Four classes of decision making heuristics have been proposed to describe how 
individuals search through a limited and known set of alternatives to make a selection.133 
In these situations, search is conducted not over a set of alternatives, but over the 
attributes of those alternatives.134 Search and stopping rules vary by heuristic, but 
generally involve searching through cues until there is sufficient information to 
discriminate between two alternatives, at which point the better option will be 
selected.135 The four classes of heuristics that guide decision making when presented 
with a limited number of known alternatives are recognition-based decision making, one-
reason decision making, compensatory decision making, and social decision making.136 
Recognition-based decision making heuristics leverage the automatic recognition 
process that occurs prior to deliberate memory recall.137 The recognition heuristic 
facilitates binary decisions when one alternative is recognized and the other is not by 
assuming the recognized alternative has a higher value and selects that option.138 The 
fluency heuristic provides a solution for when both alternatives in a binary decision are 
recognized, by assuming that the alternative that was recognized faster must be more 
desirable, and will therefore be selected.139 These heuristics are ecologically rational, and 
therefore can be relied upon to produce accurate results, in domains where recognition of 
an alternative is positively correlated with that alternative possessing desirable 
attributes.140  
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One-reason decision making methods rely upon the process of memory recall to 
guide selections.141 One clever cue heuristics are highly domain-specific, using a single, 
pre-determined cue to guide decisions, such as the number of spots in peacock plumage 
for mating selection, or the angle of gaze for baseball players deciding whether to 
continue moving or stop where they are when tracking a fly ball.142 The take-the-best 
heuristic searches through the attributes of two potential alternatives in order of attribute 
importance until a discriminating attribute is found, and then selects on the basis of this 
best, discriminating attribute.143 The take-the-last heuristic simply searches through 
attributes not in order of attribute relevance, but by order of the most recently used, 
discriminating attributes.144 Fast-and-frugal decision trees are commonly used in 
emergency medicine diagnoses or sentencing decisions, and only require a series of 
simple, binary choices that scale linearly with the number of possible attributes to 
consider in order to reach a decision, as opposed to rational choice models which would 
require evaluation of an exponential number of possible outcomes.145 These heuristics 
are thought to be ecologically rational when cues are redundant and there is significant 
variability in cue values.146 
Compensatory decision making heuristics ignore either the magnitude of cue 
weights, or even the overall desirability of alternatives, in order to facilitate the selection 
process. The tallying heuristic compares all attributes for two alternatives and selects the 
alternative that is positively discriminated on a greater number of attributes.147 This 
heuristic is successful when there is no more than 10 times the number of alternatives as 
attributes under consideration, when it is difficult to predict the discriminating criterion, 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 463. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of 
Bounded Rationality,” Psychological Review 103, no. 4 (1996): 653. 
144 Ibid., 660–61. 
145 Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, “Heuristic Decision Making,” 467. 
146 Ibid., 469. 
147 Ibid. 
 26 
and there is high cue redundancy.148 The 1/N heuristic, on the other hand, assumes that 
all alternatives are equally desirable and allocates resources equally to all alternatives.149 
Financial strategies that distribute money equally among investments can outperform 
many optimizing strategies in predicting future values.150 
Social decision making heuristics for known sets of alternatives leverage 
information gained from other people to guide choice. Imitate-the-successful and imitate-
the-majority are two heuristics that individuals use to quickly determine what attribute 
ordering to use when comparing several alternatives.151 Beyond simply guiding the cue 
priority by which individuals compare alternatives, social heuristics can also influence 
choice directly. A series of experiments found that many individuals will suppress their 
own choices or judgments and decide instead to conform to a unanimous majority that 
settles on a different selection.152 Another highly influential decision making heuristic 
guides individuals to comply with injunctive pressure received from perceived authority 
figures.153 Social heuristics are ecologically rational and particularly beneficial in 
domains where the decision maker is very inexperienced or uncertain.154 
6. Choice Architecture 
Choice architecture is the practice of deliberately structuring environments to 
guide behavior and choice by taking advantage of nonrational heuristics.155 This concept 
was introduced in the book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness, written by Thaler and Sunstein, which claims that change can be 
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accomplished through the use of a titular Nudge that “alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.”156 These authors are careful to defend the practice of choice architecture by 
pointing out that there is no such thing as a neutral option–even a random presentation of 
alternatives, attributes and defaults will manipulate behavior; therefore, they claim that 
no harm is done by arranging these factors to encourage beneficial behaviors.157 This 
review of choice architecture is organized in two parts: the first subsection presents 
numerous nudges and efforts by scholars to organize these methods, while the second 
subsection examines the role of Dual System Theory in classifying nudges as acting upon 
intuitive or reflective cognitive processes. 
a. Describing and Organizing Nudges 
Several teams of scholars have proposed frameworks that attempt to organize the 
many nudges enumerated by choice architects. Initially, the many nudges introduced 
alongside choice architecture were only loosely grouped according to the general area of 
desired change, such as money, health, or freedom.158 In working to provide structure to 
choice architecture, most scholars have sought to organize nudges by the type of 
intervention technique employed.159 A proposed synthesis of these intervention technique 
frameworks divides nudges into three categories: interventions that affect the information 
provided to decision makers, interventions that influence the decision structure itself, and 
interventions that provide decision assistance.160 
The first class of interventions described by the synthesized nudge framework 
guide behavior and choice by changing the amount or nature of information that decision 
makers have about alternatives, as well as the social information that decision makers 
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have about the behaviors and opinions of others regarding the behavior or choice in 
question.161 The number of attributes visible for each alternative affects choice, as a large 
number of attributes can force decision makers to employ a simplifying heuristic that 
only considers a single attribute.162  
To ensure that individuals base their decisions on the attribute that the choice 
architect desires, visible attributes should be kept to a small number or possibly even 
limited to just one cue.163 An example of this nudge is Thaler and Sunstein’s ice cream 
shop that controls information to influence decisions by only advertising the flavor of 
each ice cream choice, while concealing other attributes such as calories or 
ingredients.164 
Modifying the appearance of an option’s attributes through framing, or by 
simplification and reordering of the attributes can also influence decisions.165 Framing 
effects are seen when the number of patients electing to undergo surgery is different 
when probabilities are presented in terms of survival rates rather than death rates.166 
Thaler and Sunstein also make a very simple reference to the influence of cue ordering 
and simplification in arguing for more informative “mappings” from attributes to value, 
suggesting that digital cameras should be listed first by the attribute of maximum print 
size rather than megapixels or cues.167 
Social norms can also be used to shape the search process, either through 
descriptive norms whereby individuals use imitate-the-majority or imitate-the-successful 
heuristics to conform to the behavior of others, or through the injunctive norm of peer 
pressure.168 Choice architects claim that individuals can be nudged to file their tax 
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returns by reporting that most other citizens have already complied, students can be 
nudged to drink less alcohol by providing statistics on average drinking rate of their 
fellow students, and homeowners’ energy use can be nudged towards convergence when 
average energy consumption within a community is revealed.169 
The second class of interventions that choice architects adjust to direct an 
individual’s search and choice process includes the number, nature, or presentation order 
of available options, the amount of time subjects have to make decisions, temporal 
landmarks, and the default outcome when no behavior is chosen.170 When confronted 
with a large number of alternatives, individuals shift from a compensatory strategy that 
considers the various advantages of many attributes, to a simplified strategy that only 
evaluates a subset of attributes about each choice.171 Thaler and Sunstein suggest that 
choice architects should either keep the number of alternatives small so individuals can 
weigh all pros and cons and make good decisions on their own, or provide nudges such as 
option groupings as paint stores do with color wheels, or use social conformity nudges as 
Netflix does in providing movie recommendations based on other users’ preferences to 
guide decisions when the set of available options is very large.172 
The nature of the available alternatives can also influence choice through framing 
and anchoring effects.173 Framing a decision between physical and online newspaper 
subscription options by introducing a clearly inferior, dominated decoy option can nudge 
individuals to purchase more expensive subscriptions.174 Suggested donation amounts on 
solicitation requests serve as anchors that nudge respondents’ philanthropy.175 The order 
and location of alternatives is another method that choice architects use to guide choice, 
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as seen in school cafeteria nudges that influence consumption of particular food items by 
adjusting the location and ordering of food choices.176 
Limiting the amount of time available for individuals to implement behaviors that 
have delayed utility implications can make these actions appear more salient and increase 
performance of these behaviors, as seen in short windows for changing healthcare or 
retirement plans.177 Temporal landmarks, which include birthdays, anniversaries, and the 
beginnings of weeks, months or years, can be exploited to seek changes in behavior, as 
individuals appear to be more willing to consider new alternatives when conducting 
search processes at these times.178 
Finally, structuring environments so desired choices are presented as defaults that 
do not require a significant change in occupant behavior will produce an increase in these 
selections.179 The power of nudging through defaults is seen clearly in organ donation 
rates, where 99 percent of Austrians accept their default choice to opt-in as organ donors, 
while only 12 percent of Germans deviated from their opt-out default to register as 
donors.180 
The third class of nudges described in the synthesized intervention technique 
framework consists of decision aids that include reminders and commitments. Reminders 
influence behavior and choice by making certain previously known information more 
salient.181 The image of a fly in a urinal is described in Nudge: Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth, and Happiness as a reminder that engages reflective system 2 
cognitive processes to trigger a decision as to whether or not to aim at the fly, thereby 
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reducing spilled urine by 80 percent.182 Public or private commitments also influence 
behavior, as individuals may be more likely to follow through with their intentions.183 
Stickk is an online commitment website that uses financial incentives and private or 
public commitments to help individuals achieve their goals by intentionally eliciting peer 
pressure to promote desired behaviors.184 Beyond attempts to merely categorize nudges, 
there are also efforts underway to understand the underlying cognitive processes that are 
engaged by nudges. 
b. Dual System Theory and Nudges 
Little distinction is made between automatic behavior and deliberate choice in the 
initial introduction of choice architecture. In Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, Thaler and Sunstein explicitly reference Dual System Theory’s 
automatic system 1 and reflective system 2 processes and adopt the heuristics and biases 
view of behavioral economics that considers heuristics of the intuitive system 1 to be the 
source of errors in judgment that compromise the reflective system 2’s ability to make 
optimal decisions.185 The authors then provide examples of nudges, such as a series of 
perpendicular lines painted on a road that are spaced closer together on the approach to a 
dangerous curve, thereby causing drivers to unconsciously slow down as the increased 
frequency of passing lines creates a false impression of increased speed.186 Another 
nudge uses smaller dinner plate sizes to reduce caloric intake.187 Mindless behavior, as in 
unintentional overeating, is explained by the authors two ways: as a choice between 
eating none, some, or all of the food in front of a person, and also as an automatic 
behavior performed by intuitive system 1 cognitive processes without reflection.188 After 
describing the commonly accepted intuitive heuristics of anchoring, availability, and 
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representativeness, along with Prospect Theory’s loss aversion and intuitive social 
imitation herding heuristics, the authors then proceed to enumerate numerous decision 
making nudges without further exploration of the different cognitive processes engaged 
by these two types of interventions.189 
Other scholars, however, draw more attention to the role of the intuitive and 
reflective cognitive processes in choice architecture. These authors assert that all nudges 
work by directly influencing the automatic system 1, as this is believed to be the source 
of all human perception and judgments that are the context upon which decisions are 
made.190 But they differentiate between those nudges that remain within the realm of 
automatic thinking to influence intuitive judgments only, and another group of nudges 
that are designed to guide conscious, reflective system 2 decisions.191 The narrowing 
road lines and smaller plate size nudges are categorized as type 1 nudges that only 
activate the intuitive system 1, while the fly in the urinal and the positive or negative 
framing of surgery results are defined as type 2 nudges that influence the reflective 
thinking of system 2’s decision making process.192 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the literature on rational choice, reasoned behavior, and 
behavioral economics to present four explanations for individual action. Rational choice 
depicts human decisions as the direct outputs of Expected Utility Theory.193 Reasoned 
behavior considers an individuals’ observed behaviors to be direct products of their 
beliefs.194 The heuristics and biases program of behavioral economics views individual 
actions to be influenced by the intuitive heuristics of system 1.195 The fast and frugal 
heuristics program of behavioral economics asserts that individuals’ choices result from 
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deliberate use of heuristic decision making strategies.196 These interpretations of 
individual action suggest four different models that may be used to analyze public health 
and safety interventions. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will perform a comparative case study across a number of individual-
level public health and safety interventions. Each case will be analyzed using a four-
model approach to detect the intervention methods that are correlated with the outcome 
of that case. Comparative analysis between these sets of intervention methods and 
associated case outcomes will permit identification of a refined set of methods that are 
correlated with success across the entire selection of cases examined by this thesis. The 
conclusions drawn from these findings may be applied and generalized beyond the 
confines of their original cases to design effective public health and safety interventions, 
including those in fire and life safety education. This chapter defines the four models of 
analysis that will be applied to each case, describes the comparative case study 
methodology, and provides a summary of the present research design. 
A. MODELS 
Models are used to facilitate understanding of events or phenomenon that occur in 
the real world. Models may be conceptual, mathematical, or physical, and provide a 
means of describing processes or relationships that are difficult to observe directly.197 
Models of decision making attempt to explain why an individual made certain choices, 
while models of behavior seek to describe why an individual performed a particular 
action.198 These models may also be used in a predictive fashion by extrapolating a set of 
observed or hypothetical initial conditions using the assumptions and implications of a 
model to forecast future outcomes.199 
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1. Simplifications of Reality 
All models are simplifications of reality that make certain assumptions regarding 
the factors that precipitate a decision or behavior.200 In a noisy environment, there are 
many variables that do not influence a particular outcome.201 The ultimate goal of 
scientific theory or modeling is to eliminate this noise and simplify the set of determinant 
factors to as small a number of variables as possible without losing any ability to explain 
or predict outcomes.202 Due to the extremely large number of variables that may 
influence an outcome, however, most models are unable to incorporate every relevant 
variable and are instead forced to make simplifying assumptions that ignore some of 
these causal factors.203 
Simplified models do not account for every causal factor in a process or outcome 
and therefore will contain some degree of error.204 Several scholars who promote fast and 
frugal heuristics as neutral decision makings strategies acknowledge this and assert that, 
“All models are wrong.”205 Despite some unavoidable inaccuracy, however, 
appropriately designed models can still provide much benefit.206 The validity of a model 
can be tested by referencing longitudinal studies to check if the model’s predictions 
match the observed final results based on known starting conditions. A caveat, however, 
is that highly complicated models that fit existing data very accurately may be worse at 
forecasting future events than models with only a few free variables.207 This can occur 
when the influence of noise within the data that does not contribute to the decision or 
behavior under study is amplified by an overly complicated model.208 A model is 
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considered robust when it is able to explain existing data and forecast future outcomes 
accurately.209 
Multiple models may exist that describe the same real world process or 
phenomenon in a variety of ways. By adopting a different set of simplifying assumptions, 
each model will provide an alternate explanation of the casual factors and relevant 
processes that are responsible for producing observed results.210 Similarly, multiple 
models may offer differing predictions of the future based upon the same initial 
conditions. The varied explanations proffered by the various literatures on rational 
choice, reasoned behavior, and behavioral economics, as well as the interpretation of 
events as being either choice among alternatives or behaviors in isolation, demonstrates 
the very subjective nature of efforts to describe the real world processes of decision 
making and behavior. 
2. Rational, Reasoned, or Nonrational? Choice or Behavior? 
Decisions can be interpreted in very different ways depending on whether they are 
analyzed using a rational or nonrational decision making model. Classical economics’ 
decision making models assume that individuals will always make rational selections, 
which according to this school of thought are defined as choices that are self-interested 
and optimal.211 This implies that every choice observed in a longitudinal study must 
maximize expected utility for that individual. The fast and frugal heuristics branch of 
behavioral economics, however, makes no such assumptions, instead describing an 
individual’s decision making process as ecologically rational if they select a heuristic that 
uses simplified search, stopping, and decision rules that take advantage of the structure of 
the current environment and produce accurate and reliable results within that domain.212 
By using a different set of assumptions, the nonrational decision making described by 
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behavioral economics is free to consider a far wider range of decision making strategies 
that are not self-interested and optimal. 
Similarly, identification of the causal factors that precipitate behavior and 
predictions of future behavior may vary greatly depending on whether a reasoned or 
nonrational model is used for analysis. Reasoned models of behavior assume that 
behavioral intentions and observed behaviors are always generated directly from an 
individual’s pre-formed beliefs regarding those behaviors.213 This causal relationship 
from reason to intention has been assumed to exist in many cross-sectional studies, 
despite failing to provide evidence demonstrating the direction of this relationship, or 
even proving that this relationship is anything more than correlation.214 A very valid and 
contradictory view could assert instead that the behaviors that an individual performs or 
intends to perform are responsible for and produce conscious reasons.215 This is the view 
espoused by Haidt, who argues that the conscious reasons that we often think direct our 
behavior are in fact post-hoc creations constructed to justify our intuitive, emotional 
responses to stimuli.216 Haidt’s view parallels that of behavioral economics, which 
considers many behaviors in isolation to be produced directly by heuristics of the 
intuitive system 1 without activation of deliberate, reflective system 2 processes.217 
Reasoned behavior asserts that a driver who slows down on approach to the curve 
described in the narrowing lines nudge would claim to have slowed down because they 
recognized they were going too fast, but Haidt would argue that the driver had first 
slowed down without conscious thought and then only afterwards constructed the 
conscious reasoning to justify their behavior. 
Further subjectivity is introduced when an individual’s actions are modeled either 
as decision making among alternatives or as single behaviors in isolation. This potential 
duality of interpretation is demonstrated (perhaps unintentionally) in Nudge: Improving 
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Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, when Thaler and Sunstein describe the 
continued eating of cocktail nuts before dinner in two different ways: as a decision 
making process whereby individuals must select between several alternatives, in this case 
eating none, some, or all of the nuts; and also as an act of mindless eating carried out by 
intuitive system 1 processes of the brain without conscious deliberation or consideration 
of other alternatives.218 Thaler and Sunstein are inconsistent in highlighting the inherent  
subjectivity of interpreting actions as either behavior or choice, however, when they 
present the act of slowing an automobile when encountering narrowing road lines at a 
curve solely through the lens of isolated behavior without consideration for other 
alternatives.219 As has been demonstrated, this same action could instead be interpreted 
as a decision between continuing the same speed, speeding up, or slowing down. 
Similarly, the influence of plate size on caloric intake can be viewed as either the 
mindless eating of an automatic behavior in isolation, or instead may be interpreted as a 
decision between continuing to eat or stopping. 
Even the aspiration-level satisficing heuristic introduced by Simon can be 
described as either decision making or behavior in isolation depending on the 
assumptions of the model used for analysis. Aspiration-level heuristics may appear to be 
decision making among alternatives because the search rule proceeds through available 
alternatives in some order until a satisficing option is found. On the other hand, 
aspiration-level theories might also be interpreted as behavior in isolation because they 
make no comparison between possible alternatives. Each available choice is considered 
serially in isolation and enacted if the alternative exceeds an individual’s aspiration level, 
at which point the enumeration of further options is terminated. Do aspiration-level 
theories represent decisions among alternatives, or do they instead describe a series of 
isolated behavioral considerations? Neither view is wrong; both merely reflect the 
application of different models to understand the same action. 
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3. Multiple Models to Improve Analysis 
Conducting analysis using multiple models can aid understanding. Because all 
models are subjective simplifications of reality, the application of several different 
models may present additional perspectives on a particular process or action.220 Viewing 
an event through multiple models may also increase the confidence of conclusions by 
corroborating results across several models. Conversely, if a model consistently 
underperforms the descriptive and predictive capabilities of other models, it may suggest 
that the assumptions of the poor-performing model should be reconsidered. Finally, the 
insights gained by comparing and contrasting the interpretations of multiple models may 
facilitate the synthesis and creation of new, more successful models.221 The benefit of 
combining or integrating several models towards achieving a single goal has already been 
demonstrated in health and safety, where multi-model approaches have shown greater 
predictive accuracy and produced larger health improvements than single models on their 
own.222 
Each health or safety intervention examined in the course of this comparative case 
study will be analyzed using a four-model approach to elicit multiple perspectives 
regarding the intervention methods that may have contributed to the program’s success or 
failure. The four models of analysis can be described by a 2x2 matrix where the vertical 
axis divides rational and reasoned models on the left from nonrational models on the 
right, while the horizontal axis distinguishes between models that interpret an 
individual’s actions as decision making among alternatives in the top two quadrants, and 
models that view actions as behaviors in isolation located in the bottom two quadrants 
(see Table 1). 
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Table 1.   Four Models of Analysis 




Model 1  
Rational Decision Making using 
Expected Utility Theory 
(Classical Economics) 
Model 4 
Nonrational Decision Making 





Reasoned Behavior in Isolation 
using The Integrative Model of 
Behavioral Prediction 
Model 3 
Nonrational Behavior in Isolation 
Resulting from Intuitive 
Heuristics 
 
a. Model 1: Rational Decision Making with Expected Utility Theory 
Model 1 represents rational decision making among alternatives using classical 
economics’ Expected Utility Theory. This model assumes that individuals always behave 
in an economically rational manner meaning that they will act in their own self-interest 
and are always capable of identifying and selecting the optimal course of action. Model 1 
describes a process of decision making among alternatives wherein individuals are 
omnisciently aware of all possible alternatives available to them, the outcomes that will 
occur for each possible choice, and the expected utility associated with every outcome. 
The nature of Model 1’s Expected Utility Theory suggests several inferences 
when analyzing an intervention. Integral to this model are the assumptions of selfish 
choice and maximization.223 This implies that any choices observed in a longitudinal 
study must represent the optimal choice for that individual. Prediction using Model 1 is a 
simple matter of calculating the expected utility offered by every available alternative and 
then selecting the option that maximizes this value. 
The inability of rational choice to permit non-optimizing choices is a shortcoming 
that has forced awkward explanations to justify seemingly suboptimal decisions made by 
individuals in experiments. When confronted with empirical laboratory findings that 
reveal subjects selecting non-optimizing alternatives, economists who support rational 
choice have claimed that the rewards offered in the offending studies must have been 
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insufficient to motivate the selfish and maximizing decisions that supposedly reign in the 
real world.224 The validity of this model could be called into question if studies exist that 
reveal individuals selecting provably suboptimal choices. 
b. Model 2: Reasoned Behavior using The Integrative Model of Behavioral 
Prediction 
Model 2 uses the Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction (IMBP) to represent 
the entire field of reasoned behavior. The IMBP asserts that behaviors are performed 
when individuals possess intent, necessary skills, and are not faced with environmental 
barriers that would prevent the behavior.225 Intention is assumed to be the product of an 
individual’s attitudes about the costs and benefits of the behavior, their perception 
regarding the opinions that others hold about the behavior, and the individual’s 
confidence that they are capable of performing the behavior correctly.226 According to 
the IMBP, every individual holds pre-formed, reasoned beliefs of varying strength about 
each of these three causal factors of intention.227 The influence of each of the three 
determinant intentional factors is constant for every population-behavior pair.228 The 
likelihood that an individual will intend to perform a behavior is determined by the 
combined strength of their beliefs about each of the three causal factors of attitudes, 
subjective norms, and self-efficacy, moderated by the influence of each factor for the 
population-behavior pair.229 Barring a lack of skills or the presence of environmental 
barriers, the probability that an individual will perform a behavior is equivalent to their 
intentional probability.230 
The IMBP assumes that the influence of each of the three intentional factors for a 
population-behavior pair can be determined by conducting cross-sectional surveys to 
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identify correlations between individual’s stated beliefs and their self-reported intentions 
and behaviors.231 Because Model 2’s IMBP assumes that reasoned beliefs precede and 
produce intention, and that intention precedes and produces behavior, these correlational 
relationships are assumed to be causal from belief to intention.232 This assumption and 
the ready use of cross-sectional surveys introduces a weakness to Model 2, however, as it 
is possible that an individual’s stated reasoning was actually a product of their intuitive 
intentions, a shortcoming that can be addressed through the use of longitudinal 
surveys.233 
The IMBP used as Model 2 for this comparative case study provides its own set 
of implications that can aid in explaining, predicting, and changing health and safety 
behaviors. Following from the IMBP, if an intervention causes an individual to change 
their behavior, then the individual’s reasoned beliefs regarding one or more of the 
relevant, causal factors of intention (attitudes, subjective norms, or self-efficacy) must 
have changed. If the changed belief or beliefs can be identified, then the IMBP asserts 
that the factor associated with those reasoned beliefs must have a meaningful impact on 
intent to perform this behavior for every member of the same population.234 Also implied 
by the assumptions of the IMBP, if the strength of an individual’s reasoned beliefs 
regarding a factor that is known to be relevant for the population-behavior pair can be 
changed, then a change in intention must follow, along with a change in actual behavior 
(barring a lack of skills or presence of environmental barriers). A lack of intention change 
in this situation would either invalidate the model, or would imply that the individual is 
not a member of the population described by the population-behavior pair. Behavioral 
prediction under Model 2 can be accomplished after the influence of each intentional 
factor is defined for the population-behavior pair by simply examining the strength of an 
individual’s stated, reasoned beliefs regarding those factors.235 Further, the IMBP of 
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Model 2 suggests that behavioral change is best accomplished by designing interventions 
to alter individuals’ beliefs regarding the most influential of the intentional factors for 
that population-behavior pair.236 
c. Model 3: Nonrational Behavior Resulting from Intuitive Heuristics 
Model 3 considers actions to be isolated behaviors that are produced by the 
simplified heuristics of behavioral economics. This model borrows heavily from the 
heuristics and biases branch of behavioral economics that views heuristics as simplified 
shortcuts employed by intuitive system 1 cognitive processes.237 It also assumes that all 
individuals are typically influenced by the same heuristics when confronted with similar 
situations. In a departure from Tversky and Kahneman’s program, however, this model 
dispenses with the normative aspect of classical economics’ rationality that views 
heuristics to be error-prone shortcuts that prevent optimal behavior. 
As a parallel to models of reasoned behavior, Model 3 only considers behaviors in 
isolation with no notion of alternatives or an optimal behavior. This model will also be 
confined to heuristics that operate solely within the domain of intuitive system 1 thought, 
as once an individual engages their reflective system 2 cognitive processes to deliberate 
between two available behaviors, or simply to choose between performing a behavior or 
not performing a behavior, they have left the realm of behavior in isolation and entered 
the realm of decision among alternatives. 
Analyzing interventions using Model 3 will interpret observed actions as isolated 
behaviors that have been produced directly by intuitive heuristics. The heuristics that 
influence behavior include representativeness, availability, and anchoring as described by 
the initial heuristics and biases program, along with affect, optimism, loss aversion, and 
intuitive social heuristics. The representativeness, availability, and anchoring heuristics 
predispose individuals to perform behaviors that appear familiar or are similar to 
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situations encountered previously.238 Affect simply describes an automatic and 
uncontrollable positive or negative feeling in response to stimuli.239 Optimism prevents 
individuals from properly assessing fear appeals or evaluating threats.240 Loss aversion 
produces the status quo bias wherein the loss produced by abandoning the automatically 
assigned default condition is weighted more heavily than any potential gains that could 
be obtained by switching from the default option.241 Social influences also affect 
behavior in isolation, either through descriptive norms whereby individuals imitate the 
observed behavior of groups or role models (herding), or through injunctive social norms 
that demonstrate approval or disapproval for an individual’s behavior.242 Public 
commitments produce an intuitive desire to maintain consistency between actual behavior 
and any stated self-characterizations of behavior in order to avoid dissonance.243 These 
heuristics comprise Haidt’s elephant, the mass of intuitions that direct behavior even as 
individuals believe that their reflectively stated reasons are in control. 
Model 3 is fully capable of analyzing interventions that purport to study decision 
making among alternatives, despite the fact that this model only considers behaviors in 
isolation. This is because according to Model 3, individuals never actually engage in 
choosing among alternatives. Instead, Model 3 interprets an individual’s behavior (in this 
case selecting one of the alternatives) to result directly from heuristics of the intuitive 
system 1 cognitive process with no deliberate, reflective consideration for other 
alternatives. Although the individual may be able to offer reasoned explanations for why 
they chose one alternative over the others after the act of choosing, Model 3 asserts that 
these reasons were actually post-hoc justifications created after the individual had already 
initiated the observed behavior. 
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Explanation, prediction, and change of behavior using Model 3 are purely a 
function of automatic heuristics. Any reasons explicitly stated by an individual to explain 
their own behaviors or actions are discarded, as Model 3 considers all behaviors to be 
automatically determined by intuitive heuristics. Explanation of behavior is instead 
accomplished by analyzing common behavioral themes across a number of subjects to 
propose an intuitive heuristic that could explain the observed behavioral trends of these 
individuals.244 Prediction relies upon first identifying the heuristic engaged by a 
particular environment or stimulus, and then forecasting an individual’s future behavior 
as a function of that heuristic. An important distinction from Model 2 is that behavioral 
change under Model 3 cannot be accomplished through appeals to reason or by changing 
beliefs–rather, behavior change under Model 3 will only be achieved by using choice 
architecture to design environmental stimuli that leverage the intuitive heuristics of 
automatic system 1 thought processes. 
d. Model 4: Nonrational Decision Making with Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
Model 4 interprets individuals’ actions as the results of decision making processes 
that use the simplified heuristic strategies of behavioral economics. This model aligns 
closely with the fast and frugal heuristics branch of behavioral economics, in which 
individuals consciously and deliberately use simplified decision making heuristics that 
require less effort than optimizing methods and are able to produce more accurate results 
when ecologically rational.245 Although this model accepts that the intuitive system 1 
employs heuristics that may influence an individual’s understanding of their 
environment, an individual’s actions will always be viewed as conscious choices that are 
based on decision making heuristics controlled by the reflective system 2. These decision 
making strategies can be described as a set of search, stopping, and decision rules to 
simplify and aid choice when confronted with either a large number of alternatives, or 
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when deciding between a limited and known set of alternatives on the basis of a large set 
of attributes.246 
This model has greatly relaxed assumptions compared to the rational decision 
making model of Expected Utility Theory, and therefore provides far fewer implications 
for analysis. Model 4 makes no assumption that individuals will behave selfishly and 
optimally. In fact, it accepts that many individuals will use suboptimal decision making 
strategies in many situations. What Model 4 does assert, however, is that for many 
situations there exist simplified decision making heuristics that may produce satisfactory 
results within that domain. 
Model 4 explains actions as choices resulting from nonrational decision making 
heuristics, an approach that implies a particular approach to predicting and influencing 
future decisions. Analysis using Model 4 attempts to identify the decision making 
heuristics and search, stopping, and decision rules influenced by interventions to 
encourage individuals to select beneficial health and safety choices. Individuals who 
choose unhealthy or unsafe options are assumed to have used different decision making 
heuristics which could either be a different strategy altogether, or a similar heuristic 
strategy but with different search, stopping, and decision rules based perhaps off of 
different cue orderings or attribute values. 
Prediction according to Model 4 depends upon both the individual and the 
environment in which they make their decisions. An individual’s experiences and 
knowledge, physical cues present in the environment, and social cues perceived from 
others all have a significant influence on the heuristic decision making strategies that 
individual will use to decide on a course of action.247 According to Model 4, 
improvement in public health and safety can be accomplished either by conditioning 
individuals to use specific heuristic decision making strategies and search, stopping, and 
decision rules that are likely to produce beneficial individual-level choices, or by 
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designing physical and social environments as in choice architecture in order to 
encourage the selection of these same strategies and rules. 
B. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN 
A comparative case study of individual-level interventions designed to influence 
seat belt, bicycle helmet, and alcohol use will benefit practitioners seeking to produce 
future health and safety programs. While numerous studies have been conducted in these 
fields, no validated models have been established to describe the factors that cause 
individuals to perform beneficial health and safety actions.248 Without such models, it is 
difficult to determine which intervention methods are responsible for altering individuals’ 
actions and generating effective programs. To address this issue, the present research will 
first analyze a set of interventions using a four-model approach to detect the methods 
used in each case, and then compare those sets of methods between cases to identify 
which methods are correlated with success across the selection of health and safety 
interventions examined in this thesis. 
Comparison across cases may permit inference of intervention methods that 
produce successful programs in an assortment of health and safety fields. Searching a set 
of cases for patterns to generate hypotheses is an established use of the case study 
research design.249 By considering the intervention methods and associated outcomes of 
multiple cases, it is hoped that a pattern of methods correlated with program success may 
be detected. This set of potentially influential methods could inform future interventions 
and serve as a basis for the eventual development of an established theory for changing 
public health and safety practices. 
The cases within this study describe public health and safety interventions 
performed on a distinct population. Cases are merely data points, defined to suit the 
purposes of the study that uses them.250 Within the present research, a case is defined as a 
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set of intervention methods used on a population to produce a program outcome. A single 
study may yield multiple cases for analysis if different sets of methods were employed to 
influence two or more populations, or if a single set of intervention methods produced 
different outcomes when applied to two or more populations. 
Like all research designs, the comparative case study requires a formal 
methodological description.251 An explicit statement of the steps taken in conducting this 
study will guide implementation and allow for replication, thereby enhancing the 
credibility of its results and conclusions.252 
1. Identify Research Question 
The first step in conducting a comparative case study on individual-level health 
and safety interventions is to define the research question.253 The question that this thesis 
seeks to answer is: 
How can we design successful individual-level interventions to improve public 
health and safety? 
2. Identify Variables to be Explored 
A strength of the comparative case study is that it permits exploration of the 
relationships between independent and dependent variables through the use of multiple 
cases.254 The goal of this thesis is to determine how to design successful individual-level 
health and safety interventions. To focus inquiry, this thesis hypothesizes that 
interventions work by employing some set of methods to influence the factors that 
determine how individuals act, thereby governing program outcome. The independent 
variables suggested by this hypothesis are the intervention’s methods, and the dependent 
variable is program outcome. 
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To investigate the relationship between intervention methods and program 
outcome, it is first necessary to be capable of expressing all possible routes by which a 
method may have influenced an individual’s actions within each case. The four models of 
analysis each define their own set of factors that determine individuals’ actions, and each 
of these factors and the methods that influence them must be represented. To provide 
structure, these factors will be organized into four arrays. The elements contained within 
an array will correspond to the factors of behavior or decision making as defined by the 
associated model. Because each of the four models defines a different set of factors to 
explain an individual’s actions, the four arrays will contain different sets of factors: 
a. Model 1 Array: Expected Utility Theory 
The only factor defined by this model is expected utility, and therefore the array 
for this model consists of only a single element representing this factor. 
b. Model 2 Array: Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction 
The IMBP of Model 2 defines behavior to be caused by intent, which is 
comprised of attitudes based on perceived costs and benefits, subjective norms, and self-
efficacy, along with necessary skills and a lack of environmental barriers.255 The array of 
elements associated with Model 2 will contain five variables: attitudes, subjective norms, 
self-efficacy, skills, and absence of barriers. 
c. Model 3 Array: Nonrational Behavior in Isolation 
Behavior according to Model 3 is a direct result of the intuitive heuristics that 
occur within the automatic system 1 cognitive processes in response to stimuli in the 
environment. Accordingly, the array that corresponds to the factors defined by Model 3 
will include seven elements to represent the intuitive heuristics that govern behavior 
under this model: representativeness, availability, anchoring, affect, optimism, loss 
aversion, and social pressure. 
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d. Model 4 Array: Nonrational Decision Making 
Model 4 asserts that individual’s decisions are determined by the nature of the 
nonrational decision making heuristic that they use to make their selection. Therefore, the 
array for Model 4 will represent the five categories of decision making heuristics: 
aspiration-level satisficing strategies, recognition-based strategies, one-reason strategies, 
compensatory strategies, and strategies based upon social information. Intervention 
methods may influence any of these heuristics by altering their search, stopping, or 
decision processes. 
e. Matrices of Individual Action Factor Arrays 
Combining these four arrays will produce a matrix that can describe the results of 
a four-model analysis performed on a single case (see Table 2). The matrix generated 
from the multi-model analysis of each case will represent the methods employed by that 
intervention and the factors of individual action they may have leveraged to influence 
program outcome. It is important to emphasize, however, that the methods expressed by 
each relationship are merely correlated with the outcome of the associated case. 
Comparative analysis between cases will be required to infer a set of methods that are 
correlated with successful public health and safety interventions in general. 
Table 2.   Factors of Individual Action Defined by the Four Models of Analysis 




      
Model 2 Attitudes 
 
 
Subjective Norm Self-Efficacy Skills Barriers   
Model 3 Representati
ve 









Recognition One-Reason Compensatory Social   
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f. Arrays of Intervention Methods Correlated with Case Outcome 
To facilitate comparative analysis between cases, the matrices describing 
intervention methods and activated factors of choice or behavior will be reduced to arrays 
that merely express the intervention methods employed in each case. Limiting the 
number of independent variables will permit greater opportunity for inference by 
increasing the probability that the influence of equivalent independent variables may be 
controlled.256 Although some detail will be lost when transforming each matrix into an 
array of cells corresponding to the intervention methods encountered within the selection 
of cases examined by the present thesis, this mapping may facilitate identification of the 
intervention methods that are correlated with successful public health and safety 
interventions in general. 
The independent variable arrays that represent the intervention methods used by 
each case contain one cell for every method encountered within this thesis (see Table 3). 
The array associated with each case therefore contains N elements, where N is equal to 
the number of unique intervention methods observed in the set of selected cases. As a 
consequence, these arrays cannot be constructed until every case has been analyzed and 
all intervention methods present in the selection are known. Once the set of intervention 
methods is defined, an independent variable array can be created for each case. A simple 
Boolean value assigned to each element indicates if the corresponding intervention 
method is present in the matrix generated by the four-model analysis of the associated 
case. 
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3. Case Selection 
Case selection is crucial in order to reveal the nature of the relationships present 
in health and safety interventions.257 Cases will deliberately be chosen that represent both 
successful and failed interventions. This variability in the dependent variable will enable 
inferences regarding the intervention methods that produced these outcomes.258 If a 
consistent relationship can be demonstrated between a set of methods that are correlated 
with effective interventions across a number of cases, this would suggest a set of 
generalizable methods that may be used to achieve success in other health and safety 
fields. 
Use of the comparative case study method on a selection of cases that displays 
variability in the values of some of the independent “intervention method” variables 
should enable identification of those methods that are correlated with successful 
programs in general. By examining comparable cases which employed similar but not 
identical sets of methods, the influence of the equivalent methods on program outcome 
will be controlled for and any variability observed in program outcome may be attributed 
to the dissimilar methods.259 
The studies selected for analysis describe interventions that attempted to increase 
seat belt usage, encourage bicycle helmet wearing, and discourage excessive alcohol 
consumption. Studies were deliberately selected from three different health and safety 
fields in order to encounter a greater range of potentially influential intervention methods 
and increase the likelihood of inferring a set of generalized methods correlated with 
program success that can be applied to other health and safety fields.260 Identification of 
studies for possible inclusion was accomplished by searching Proquest and Google 
Scholar with an assortment of search strings based on the topic fields seat belt, bicycle 
helmet, and alcohol, along with the terms behavior or decision. Candidate studies were 
considered for analysis only if they contained longitudinal research designs that provided 
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both pre and post intervention data so that the dependent variable of program outcome 
could be coded, and if they provided a sufficiently detailed description of intervention 
methods so that the targeted factors of individual action could be coded. 
4. Define Coding Guidelines for Assigning Values to Case Variables 
Structured rules governing the coding of case variables are essential when 
conducting a comparative case study.261 Clearly defined criteria for assigning values to 
variables facilitate consistent and reliable coding and analysis of cases, and provide 
credibility for conclusions reached by the comparative case study.262 These rules 
constitute a case codebook that may be used to replicate the present study to test its 
conclusions, as well as enable the extension and refinement of these conclusions through 
the analysis and integration of additional cases.263 
Evaluating the dependent variable of program outcome is fairly straightforward. 
A case will be deemed a Lasting Success if the intervention causes an intended 
improvement that persists beyond the withdrawal period of the study. Temporary Success 
describes cases where the intervention produces a temporary improvement that returns to 
the baseline during the withdrawal period of the case. No Effect will be coded when no 
change is observed in a single population study, or when no difference is observed 
between treatment and control groups. Temporary Unintended Consequences will 
describe interventions that produce a temporary effect that is opposite the intervention’s 
intent, and any interventions that produce a persistent counterproductive outcome will be 
labeled Unintended Consequences. Dependence on the duration of withdrawal 
measurement performed by each intervention following termination of the treatment 
condition in categorizing a case as a temporary or lasting effect is an acknowledged 
limitation of this coding method. A lack of studies reporting either Unintended 
Consequences or Temporary Unintended Consequences may be due to publication bias 
                                                 




by which researchers whose interventions worsen public health and safety rather than 
improve it may not seek publicity for this achievement. 
The matrices representing the factors of behavior or decision making that may 
have been influenced by each intervention must be produced before the independent 
variable arrays of intervention methods correlated with case outcome can be generated. 
Every case must be analyzed four times according to each of the models in order to 
interpret which intervention methods have targeted or acted upon the factors of that 
model. These interpretations are inherently subjective, an unavoidable aspect of a 
qualitative analysis. Remaining cognizant of the subjective nature of these analyses and 
adhering to the model definitions and coding methodology provided in this chapter 
should protect against bias. 
Coding of the case matrices will capture the methods used by an intervention and 
the factors of behavior or choice that these methods may have activated. When a factor of 
a model has been deemed targeted or influenced by an intervention method, the cell that 
represents the factor of individual action within the corresponding model’s array will be 
assigned a text value representing the influencing method. This indicates that the 
intervention method acting upon that factor is correlated with the program outcome. If it 
is possible to infer from a study that a factor did not influence the program outcome, then 
the associated cell will be assigned a value of zero. All other factors will remain as null 
values. The full set of intervention methods that may be assigned as values to the cells of 
the matrices will only be known after all cases within this thesis are analyzed. If future 
research analyzes other intervention cases and encounters additional intervention 
methods, these new methods would be added to this list of possible values, and the array 
of independent variables representing possible intervention methods would be expanded 
as well. 
An array of independent variables representing the intervention methods 
employed by each case will be generated by mapping from the associated case matrix. 
The cell representing each intervention method will be coded with an X if that 
intervention was present in the matrix. Although the transformation from a matrix of 
qualitative intervention methods and activated factors of individual action to an array of 
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Boolean values representing intervention methods discards information, this lossy 
simplification will facilitate comparative analysis between cases. As previously noted, 
this mapping can only be performed after all cases are analyzed. 
5. Analyze Cases to Code Variables and Identify Correlations 
Analysis of a single case will reveal a correlation between the methods used by an 
intervention and the factors of behavior or choice that these methods may have activated 
to influence program outcome. Conducting this analysis involves interpreting cases 
through the lenses of the four models to identify relevant methods and activated factors of 
individual action according to the assumptions and implications of each model. Some 
methods may be identified by more than one model or associated with more than one 
factor within a model. The result of this analysis will be represented by the matrix 
described in Table 2. After all cases are analyzed and the full set of intervention methods 
is known, the matrix for each case will be reduced to a single array of independent 
variables that describes the set of intervention methods that are correlated with the 
associated case outcome. 
6. Compare Correlations Across Cases and Make Inferences 
The final step of the comparative case study will synthesize the correlational 
results obtained from each individual case in order to identify methods that are correlated 
with the success of public health and safety interventions in general. Cases will be 
considered in pairs to test the influence of their constituent methods on program 
outcomes. Similarities between each pair of cases will be leveraged to control for the 
influence of equivalent factors, permitting inference regarding the function or reasons for 
remaining differences. 
The quantity of possible case pairings necessitates a structured approach when 
selecting interventions for comparison. Subjectivity in the selection of pairs for 
comparison threatens to introduce bias if not all combinations are analyzed. While this 
comparative analysis will not pedantically analyze all possible pairs of cases, an explicit 
methodology for locating potentially relevant combinations will be defined to protect 
against this bias. 
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A clear methodology is also needed to avoid bias when analyzing case pairings. 
The comparative analysis of two cases in this study is an unavoidably subjective 
interpretation that seeks to explain the similarities and differences observed between the 
outcomes and associated intervention methods of the cases under consideration. 
Consistency in analysis is further complicated because the elements subject to this 
comparative analysis are themselves the qualitative results of the four model analyses 
performed on each health and safety intervention included in this study. Awareness of the 
potential for subjectivity and adherence to the methodology provided below is intended to 
guard against this bias and allow for credible analysis.264 
This comparative case study will consider three classes of case pairings that each 
enable different sets of inferences. These classes provide a logical guide for selecting 
comparisons that is replicable and thorough. 
a. Identical Outcomes, Different Methods 
The first class will compare cases with the same outcome and only a small 
number of intervention methods in common. While the pair’s shared outcome might have 
been caused by varying combinations of each case’s dissimilar methods, identification of 
those methods that are common among successful health and safety programs may 
suggest a direction for further investigation. 
b. Similar Methods, Different Outcomes 
The second class of pairings will compare cases with similar but non-equivalent 
sets of intervention methods. If the arrays of independent variables that represent cases 
within this study have been designed and coded correctly, then any equivalent methods 
within the pair will be controlled for and differences in program outcome may be 
attributed to the pair’s dissimilar methods.265 Inferences regarding the dissimilar methods 
in these comparisons will be inaccurate, however, if coding did not adhere to the 
methodology specified in Chapter IV, if the four models of analysis used to interpret each 
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case were inadequate and missed an independent variable that explains the observed 
variation in program outcome, or if the mapping of intervention methods to the arrays of 
independent variables that were used for this comparative analysis lacks sufficient 
granularity to express the relevance of each factor. 
c. Identical Methods 
The third class of comparisons will only evaluate pairs of cases that employed 
identical sets of intervention methods. If the outcomes of the cases are the same, then this 
increases confidence that some subset of those methods are indeed correlated with the 
success of public health and safety interventions in general. If the cases have different 
outcomes, however, this will again suggest either a failure to adhere to the case codebook 
methodology, an inadequacy of the four models used to analyze each case, or an issue 
with mapping of the intervention methods used by each case to an array of correlated 
independent variables. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter described a methodology to seek out intervention methods that may 
be used to design successful public health and safety programs. Four models of analysis 
were developed from the fields of rational choice, reasoned behavior, and behavioral 
economics in order to detect a wide range of methods that may have influenced 
individuals and contributed to the outcome of an intervention program. Guidelines for a 
comparative case study were defined to analyze a selection of interventions and identify 
those methods that are correlated with program success in general, so that these findings 
may be applied to improve future public health and safety interventions. 
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IV. CASE ANALYSIS AND CODING 
Many studies have evaluated intervention programs that aim to improve public 
health and safety in matters of seat belt use, bicycle helmet wearing, and moderation of 
alcohol consumption. This chapter analyzes a selection of these programs in order to 
identify the intervention methods and targeted factors of individual action that are 
associated with each case outcome. Seven cases have been deliberately drawn from three 
different fields in order to enumerate methods and factors that are correlated with the 
outcomes of health and safety intervention programs in general, rather than simply 
identifying associations for a particular field. 
Interventions encouraging seat belt use have achieved significant success over the 
past several decades. Only 15 percent of vehicle occupants in the U.S. wore seat belts in 
1984, even though these safety devices were known to reduce the probability of serious 
injury or death in an automobile accident by 55 percent.266 By 2014, the seat belt 
compliance rate had increased to 87 percent.267 While some of this increase was likely 
due to mandatory seat belt laws that have been passed in 49 states, interventions that were 
implemented prior to the passage of these laws did produce sizeable increases in seat belt 
use. To avoid any possible legislative influence, all of the seat belt interventions selected 
for this comparative case study were conducted prior to the passage of mandatory laws. 
Lessons learned from the analysis of these seat belt programs may aid in the development 
of other public health and safety interventions that encourage individuals to perform new 
safety practices. 
Wearing a helmet when riding a bicycle is another important safety practice that 
has required intervention programs to encourage compliance. A properly worn bicycle 
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helmet can reduce the number of reported head injuries by 85 to 88 percent.268 Despite 
this benefit, only 18 percent of cyclists in 2005 wore helmets every time they rode, and 
76 percent of bicyclists never used a helmet.269 The factors that contribute to ownership 
and use of a bicycle helmet may be related to the determinants of smoke alarm 
compliance or other public health and safety activities that require the acquisition and 
proper use of a safety device to reduce the possibility of injury from a relatively unlikely 
event. 
Numerous interventions have also been conducted to reduce alcohol consumption 
among college students. College students consume on average twice as many drinks per 
week than the general population.270 Interventions to moderate alcohol consumption may 
prove informative because they are concerned with controlling rather than encouraging 
an action. Successful alcohol moderation programs discourage drinking, as smoke alarm 
interventions teach individuals to refrain from disconnecting smoke alarms due to 
nuisance activations, and other public health and safety interventions may similarly have 
to instill moderation or abstinence. 
This chapter on case analysis and coding is organized into eight sections. The first 
seven sections correspond to the seven intervention studies examined by this thesis. Each 
intervention study section contains a description of the methods and findings of the study, 
followed by analysis of any cases generated by that intervention. Two of the studies 
included in this thesis applied intervention methods to separate populations and achieved 
two different program outcomes; therefore, this set of seven intervention studies yields a 
total of nine cases for analysis. Analysis of each case codes the dependent variable of 
program outcome, interprets the case using the four models defined in Table 1, and 
produces the matrix of intervention methods and activated factors of individual action 
that are correlated with the case outcome as described in Table 2. Also included in the 
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analysis subsection for each case is the array of independent variables representing the 
intervention methods associated with case outcome defined in Table 3. Although these 
independent variable arrays cannot be constructed until all cases have been analyzed and 
the full set of intervention methods is discovered, these arrays are presented within each 
case’s analysis subsection to aid comprehension by providing an easily interpreted data 
structure that compiles the methods used by that case. Following the seven intervention 
study sections and their case analysis subsections, the eighth and final section of this 
chapter summarizes the current progress of the comparative case study. 
A. GELLER ET AL.  
1. Description 
Geller et al. examined the effect of incentives on seat belt usage on the Virginia 
Tech University campus.271 The study compared the observed rate of seat belt wearing at 
two different faculty/staff parking lots from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 49 consecutive 
weekdays.272 This period included 11 days to record baseline data, 24 days of 
intervention, and an additional 14 days of withdrawal following cessation of the 
intervention.273 
A pair of observers were stationed at the entrances of two separate parking lots, 
each wearing an orange safety vest and holding a clipboard with a sign “Please Stop 
Again” written on the back that was used to signal drivers entering the lot to stop.274 As a 
car approached, an available observer would display the clipboard, interact with the 
stopped driver in a manner dictated by the stage of the experiment, and record the 
driver’s gender, seat belt usage, and license plate number.275 If multiple cars approached 
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at once the observers would only signal the last car in line.276 If both observers were 
occupied no attempt would be made to stop incoming cars.277 
Observers interacted with drivers according to the stage of the experiment.278 
During the baseline condition, observers at both lots would stop drivers to say, “Just 
checking to see you’re wearing your seat belt,” and then record driver information.279 For 
the intervention period, observers stopped drivers to say, “Just checking to see you’re 
wearing your seat belt and here’s a description of how you can win valuable prizes.”280 
Observers at the two lots then implemented different treatment conditions in order to 
study the impact of contingent and noncontingent incentives.281 At the contingent lot, 
observers gave drivers who wore a seat belt a flier that promised modest incentive prizes 
for collecting multiple fliers with the same symbol printed on them, while non-wearers 
were given the same flier with no symbol and a message stating, “Next time wear your 
seat belt and receive a chance to win a valuable prize!”282 At the noncontingent lot, all 
drivers were given a flier with a symbol regardless of their seat belt use.283 When the 
treatment condition ended and the withdrawal period began, observers ceased distributing 
fliers and returned to the baseline interaction without explicitly stating that the reward 
period had ended.284 
The study reported a significant increase in seat belt wearing in the contingent lot, 
with no change observed in the noncontingent lot.285 Mean seat belt wearing rates for the 
contingent and noncontingent lots were 26.3 percent and 22.2 percent respectively during 
baseline, 45.7 percent and 24.1 percent during treatment, and 37.9 percent and 21.8 
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percent during withdrawal.286 Rate of seat belt use during withdrawal was also recorded 
as a function of the number of interactions each driver had with an observer, with seat 
belt use in the contingent lot remaining elevated until the fifth withdrawal intervention, at 
which point it returned to baseline.287 Over the course of the experiment, 2,517 
observations were recorded of 906 different vehicles at the first parking lot, and 2,808 
observations of 980 different cars were recorded at the second lot.288 Most drivers 
obeyed the observer’s request to stop and participated fully with the study.289 Only 0.01 
percent of vehicles parked in both lots.290 Any drivers who refused to participate or 
parked in both lots were excluded from the study.291 The study concluded that only 
contingent incentives influenced seat belt use.292 
2. Analysis of Case 1: Geller et al. 
a. Outcome: Temporary Success 
Although average seat belt use in the contingent lot remained elevated during the 
withdrawal period of the study, this program is coded as a Temporary Success because 
individual-level tracking of seat belt use revealed that wearing rates did return to baseline 
after five withdrawal interactions with observers.293 
b. Model 1 Analysis 
Seat belt usage is entirely determined by drivers’ selfish and optimizing 
calculations of expected utility. Using a seat belt maximizes utility for those drivers who 
wear them, whereas the utility of non-wearers is maximized by non-usage. The results 
observed in the noncontingent parking lot are expected by Model 1 because the 
                                                 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid., 409. 
288 Ibid., 407–8. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid., 408. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid., 411. 
293 Ibid., 409. 
 64 
introduction of a noncontingent reward did not affect those drivers’ calculations of 
expected utility achieved by the decision to wear a seat belt. In the contingent lot, the 
increase in seat belt use is explained by drivers who had previously calculated non-
wearing to maximize utility, but with the added utility of flier rewards the choice of 
wearing a seat belt now became the optimal choice. For those drivers in the contingent lot 
who never wore their seat belts, this additional utility was insufficient to outperform the 
non-wearing option. The delayed return to baseline usage rates in the contingent lot 
during the withdrawal period occurred because individuals were not informed that the 
incentive period had ended, and therefore they continued to calculate seat belt wearing as 
the optimal choice until they had several interactions with observers and realized that the 
reward period had ended. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
The IMBP asserts that seat belt behavior is a direct function of the individual’s 
intent, as determined by attitudes, subjective norms, and self-efficacy.294 Although 
drivers were not surveyed regarding the reasons that contributed to their seat belt 
behavior, the nature of this experiment makes it possible to identify attitudes resulting 
from a cost-benefit analysis as the only determinant factor of intent, with the other 
possible factors ruled out. Injunctive subjective norms from the fliers directing drivers to 
buckle up could not be responsible for elevated seat belt wearing in the contingent lot 
because no such change was observed in the noncontingent lot where the same fliers were 
distributed. Self-efficacy could also not have contributed to the increase in seat belt 
wearing, because if it had then usage rates would not have returned fully to baseline 
levels after the reward condition ended. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
The contingent nature of the reward in the experimental lot caused an increase in 
seat belt wearing by activating the loss aversion heuristic of these drivers. The contingent 
lot presented a situation where drivers had an opportunity to win prizes, but would lose 
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that chance if they did not wear their seat belt.295 A desire to maintain the possibility of 
winning may be responsible for the increased usage rates. The heuristics of availability or 
anchoring due to the presence of known seat belt inspectors could not explain the 
increase in the contingent lot because the observers produced no increase in the 
noncontingent lot. As with the Model 2 analysis, change could not have been due to 
social pressure communicated by observers or through the flier because this change was 
not observed in the noncontingent lot. Affect similarly cannot explain the results 
observed in this study because otherwise the positive feelings associated with seat belt 
use would have maintained elevated usage rates after the reward condition had ended. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
The possibility of receiving a reward in the contingent condition caused more 
drivers to buckle up by changing the nature of an attribute of the seat belt wearing 
alternative for either aspiration-level or one-reason decision making strategies. New seat 
belt wearing drivers may have used an aspiration-level strategy that had previously found 
the option of seat belt wearing unsatisfactory, but with the additional reward condition 
this choice now exceeded their aspiration threshold. Drivers using one-reason decision 
making strategies employed a simplified search heuristic to parse through the attributes of 
the seat belt or no seat belt options until they encountered a differentiating cue. Drivers 
who adopted seat belt wearing after the treatment period began encountered the new 
reward/no reward cue before any other differentiating attribute and accordingly chose to 
wear their seat belt. Those drivers in the contingent lot relying on one-reason decision 
making who did not adopt seat belt use must have used a different order for searching 
through the attributes associated with the two alternatives, leading them to encounter a 
different differentiating attribute that instead indicated the non-wearing decision. 
f. Coding of Case 1 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 1 is shown in Table 4. The reduced 
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array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 1 is displayed in Table 5. 
Table 4.   Geller et al. Activated Factors of Individual Action 
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Table 5.   Geller et al. Intervention Methods Correlated with Temporary Success 
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B. ROBERTSON ET AL. 
1. Description 
Robertson et al. attempted to evaluate the efficacy of television commercial 
campaigns to encourage seat belt use.296 This study was conducted in a community 
whose television cable system had been modified to permit controlled marketing 
studies.297 All 13,800 homes in this cable district received the same regular 
programming, but roughly 6,400 households were given the treatment pro-seat belt 
commercials instead of the regularly scheduled commercials viewed by the remaining 
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7,400 homes.298 Intervention commercials were displayed on the treatment cable loop 
from June 1971 through February 1972.299 Observers were stationed according to 
schedule at 14 locations in the cable district and recorded driver seat belt use and 
associated license plate number daily from May 1971 through March 1972.300 License 
plates were matched to treatment or control cable households through motor vehicle 
registration databases, allowing driver compliance/non-compliance to be coded to their 
experimental condition.301 
Treatment commercials promoted the safety benefit of seat belts by threatening 
injury to viewers and their families for non-use.302 The design of these messages was 
based on an analysis of preliminary driver interviews that purported to identify the causal 
factors associated with seat belt use.303 Six such commercials were filmed, all featuring 
high-quality production values.304 Three commercials threatened injury to boys and girls 
by featuring handicapped or scarred children who incurred their injuries because they 
were not wearing their seat belts.305 Two commercials threatened male and female adults 
with injury.306 The final commercial featured a physician to increase the credibility of 
injury threats for non-compliance with seat belt use.307 
No difference in seat belt use was observed between drivers from the intervention 
and control cable loop households throughout the ten month study.308 Both groups 
exhibited a significant decrease in rates of seat belt wearing throughout the duration of 
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the program.309 Researchers suggested that this downward trend may have been due to 
increased discomfort of seat belts when wearing bulkier winter clothes in the latter half of 
the study.310 
2. Analysis of Case 2: Robertson et al. 
a. Outcome: No Effect 
No significant difference in driver seat belt use was observed between households 
on the intervention and control cable loops.311 
b. Model 1 Analysis 
Injury threats were intended to lower the expected utility of the decision to not 
wear a seat belt, thereby making buckling up the optimal choice. No effect on seat belt 
use was observed, however, and therefore the fear appeals of this intervention must have 
been insufficient to alter drivers’ expected utility calculations. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
Injury threats directed towards individuals and their dependents were intended to 
alter cost-benefit attitudes to make seat belt wearing appear more beneficial and therefore 
increase use. Several possible Model 2 factors may explain the inability of these fear 
appeals to increase seat belt use: the fear appeals may have been inadequate to change 
attitudes, drivers might have lacked the necessary skills to buckle their seat belts, or there 
may have been environmental barriers that prevented seat belt use. Unfortunately, there is 
insufficient information in the study to infer which of these factors were responsible for 
the lack success. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
This intervention threatened individuals and their families with injury in an 
attempt to activate intuitive heuristics that would trigger seat belt wearing behavior. The 
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television commercials could have leveraged the availability or anchoring heuristics, but 
evidently failed to make seat belt wearing sufficiently salient to alter behavior. The fear 
appeals communicated through these commercials might also have encouraged belt use 
by instilling a positive affective response to buckling up or by stimulating loss aversion to 
protect against possible loss of health due to injury. These methods might have failed 
because the optimism heuristic caused individuals to discount the probability that they or 
their families would be involved in a car accident. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
Seat belt commercials had the potential to change seat belt choices by altering 
either the search, stopping, or decision rules employed by aspiration-level and one-reason 
decision making strategies. Drivers employing aspiration-level strategies might have 
considered seat belt wearing prior to any other satisficing alternative due to salience 
generated from the commercials, or the fear appeals transmitted in these messages could 
have rendered the previously acceptable choice of driving without a seat belt 
unsatisfactory. One-reason decision makers might have encountered the differentiating 
safety cue earlier in their search either due to salience from publicity or an intentional 
higher prioritization in response to the injury threat. Additionally, the injury threats may 
have changed the weights of safety cue decisions for one-reason decision makers to 
increase seat belt use. Evidently the methods of this commercial campaign were unable to 
influence any of these factors. 
f. Coding of Case 2 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 2 is shown in Table 6. The reduced 
array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 2 is displayed in Table 7. 
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Table 6.   Robertson et al. Activated Factors of Individual Action 
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Table 7.   Robertson et al. Intervention Methods Correlated with No Effect 
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C. RUDD AND GELLER 
1. Description 
Rudd and Geller conducted another Virginia Tech-based study to evaluate the 
influence of incentives on seat belt use.312 A series of sweepstakes periods was 
advertised during which time campus police recorded the license plates of drivers seen 
wearing their seat belts for entry into a rewards raffle.313 Two unobtrusive observers 
rotated among 18 different campus locations to record the seat belt use data that was 
analyzed in this study.314 The role of observing seat belt compliance was deliberately 
isolated from that of reward distribution in order to avoid a possible bias produced by 
drivers buckling up only when in proximity to campus police officers.315 
The study evaluated campus seat belt use over the course of three sweepstakes 
periods that each lasted three weeks.316 Observers recorded baseline, treatment, and 
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withdrawal seat belt use rates for each period, with 31 days of baseline observations prior 
to the first sweepstakes, and 12 days of withdrawal measurements following the final 
sweepstakes. Posters, fliers, and news releases advertised the seat belt sweepstakes as a 
program of the Virginia Tech police.317 Any driver observed by police on campus using a 
seat belt was entered into a raffle for rewards donated by local businesses.318 The only 
drivers excluded from the reward incentive were the Virginia Tech campus police 
themselves.319 A random sample of students at Virginia Tech and another nearby college 
were interviewed by telephone to ascertain awareness of the sweepstakes program, with 
78.4 percent of respondents reporting familiarity during the first treatment, and 90 
percent of students indicating knowledge of program details during the third reward 
period.320 
The sweepstakes intervention program produced a lasting increase in student, 
faculty, and staff seat belt use, along with a temporary increase in seat belt use among 
campus police officers.321 Student seat belt use increased 30.5 percent from the 
beginning of the first baseline to the final withdrawal observation following the third 
sweepstakes period.322 Faculty and staff seat belt use increased 64.2 percent from initial 
baseline to final withdrawal.323 This gain in seat belt use by students, faculty, and staff 
was maintained throughout the entirety of the study, remaining elevated during the 
withdrawal and baseline periods that followed the first two sweepstakes.324 Seat belt use 
by campus police officers also increased significantly with the onset of the first treatment 
sweepstakes period, remained elevated through the third sweepstakes, and then returned 
to baseline during the withdrawal period following the third and final treatment.325 The 
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difference between the intervention methods acting upon students, faculty, and staff, and 
the methods affecting campus police officers, as well as the different outcomes associated 
with these two populations, necessitates separate case analyses for these two groups. 
2. Analysis of Case 3: Rudd and Geller Students, Faculty, and Staff 
a. Outcome: Lasting Success 
 This program is coded as a Lasting Success for students, faculty, and staff 
because elevated seat belt use persisted for these groups throughout the withdrawal 
periods of each sweepstakes intervention.326  
b. Model 1 Analysis 
Expected Utility Theory is unable to explain the results observed in this study. 
Economic incentives from the sweepstakes rewards could have caused some drivers to 
select buckling up as the optimal decision, but their seat belt use should have returned to 
baseline when the incentive condition was removed. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
Any of the determinant factors of intention may explain the lasting increase in 
seat belt behavior. Enduring positive attitudes towards seat belt use may have been 
instilled by the temporary economic incentives. The persistent change might also have 
been caused by injunctive social pressure, as students, faculty and staff were reminded 
that the campus police were constantly monitoring their seat belt behaviors at all times. 
Self-efficacy could also explain the maintenance of elevated seat belt wearing beyond the 
incentive period, as drivers who initially responded to economic rewards may have 
continued this behavior because they found buckling up easier after a period of regular 
use. 
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d. Model 3 Analysis 
Intuitive affective and social heuristics can explain the lasting improvement in 
seat belt behavior observed among students, faculty, and staff. Economic incentives may 
have produced a positive affective association with seat belt use that continued beyond 
the reward period. These drivers may also have increased seat belt behavior as an 
automatic response to the injunctive pressure they perceived from campus police. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
This intervention may have increased student, faculty, and staff seat belt use by 
influencing the simplified aspiration-level, one-reason, or social decision making 
strategies employed by these drivers. Temporary economic incentives could have altered 
the search order of aspiration-level strategies so that the alternative of seat belt wearing 
was evaluated prior to other satisficing options, a condition that persisted because no 
other stimuli disrupted this search order during the withdrawal period. Temporary 
economic incentives may also have altered the outcome of one-reason decision making 
strategies by introducing a new reward/no reward cue that led decision makers to choose 
the seat belt wearing option for the duration of the sweepstakes period. During this time, 
however, drivers may have become more adept at wearing their seatbelts, therefore 
permanently changing the outcome of a “comfort” or “ease” cue comparison and 
producing the sustained increase in seat belt use that persisted beyond the reward period. 
Finally, injunctive social pressure from police officer authority figures might have caused 
some drivers to decide to wear their seat belts. 
f. Coding of Case 3 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 3 is shown in Table 8. The reduced 
array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 3 is displayed in Table 9. 
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Table 8.   Rudd and Geller Students/Faculty/Staff Activated Factors of 
Individual Action 
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3. Analysis of Case 4: Rudd and Geller Police Officers 
a. Outcome: Temporary Success 
Virginia Tech police officers’ seat belt use increased relative to the baseline 
during the three sweepstakes periods and the first two withdrawal periods, but then 
returned to baseline during the final withdrawal period.327 Although police officers were 
not the intended subjects of this intervention, the significant yet temporary increase in 
seat belt use by police during this program allows for additional insights into the factors 
that cause individuals to buckle up. 
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b. Model 1 Analysis 
Police officers received no benefit from the sweepstakes program for wearing 
their own seat belts, and therefore Expected Utility Theory is unable to explain the results 
observed in this study. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
The sweepstakes treatment period did not provide any economic or safety related 
benefit that might have altered police officers’ attitudes regarding seat belt use. The 
increase in police officer seat belt wearing rates also cannot be explained by increased 
self-efficacy because seat belt use returned to baseline following the third treatment 
period. The only intentional factor of Model 2 remaining that can explain this temporary 
increase is subjective norms. Descriptive norms were not at work here, as the very nature 
of the intervention made officers aware that most individuals do not wear seat belts. 
Injunctive pressure from students faculty, or staff also cannot explain these results, 
because otherwise officer’s seat belt use should have remained elevated beyond the end 
of the study. Injunctive pressure from the researchers running the study, who may have 
been perceived by police as authority figures, can explain both the increase in police seat 
belt use, and the abrupt return of police seat belt behavior to baseline levels upon 
completion of the final sweepstakes period. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
Availability and social heuristics may explain the temporary increase in police 
officer seat belt use observed during the course of this study. Simple salience from the act 
of monitoring the public’s seat belt use might have increased the availability of buckling 
up. Officers may have also felt an injunctive social pressure from researcher authority 
figures. Finally, police may have increased their seat belt use out of an intuitive desire to 
maintain consistency with the public commitment to buckle up that they implicitly made 
by encouraging others to do the same. 
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e. Model 4 Analysis 
An increased number of campus police officers decided to wear their seat belts 
during the sweepstakes period because their aspiration-level or social decision making 
strategies were influenced by the methods of this intervention. Salience from campaign 
publicity or the act of monitoring the public’s seat belt compliance might have caused 
officers to encounter the option of seat belt wearing before any other satisficing choices 
when employing aspiration-level heuristics. Additionally, injunctive social pressure from 
researchers may have guided officers to decide to buckle up for the duration of the study. 
f. Coding of Case 4 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 4 is shown in Table 10. The reduced 
array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 4 is displayed in Table 11. 
Table 10.   Rudd and Geller Police Officers Activated Factors of Individual 
Action 
Model 1 Expected 
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D. PARKIN ET AL.  
1. Description 
Parkin et al. evaluated the effect of a school-based intervention on bicycle helmet 
use among 5–14 year old children at both high-income and low-income schools in East 
York, Canada.328 Interventions were conducted at four of the 22 regional elementary 
schools, with two high-income and two low-income schools receiving the treatment 
condition.329 The remaining 18 schools were considered as controls, with three matching 
the high-income criteria, and four qualifying as low-income.330 Baseline observations 
were recorded in August and September 1990 by direct observation at school yards and 
specific observation sites selected throughout the neighborhoods surrounding each 
school.331 Post-treatment observations were recorded at these same sites from June 
through October 1991.332 
The treatment condition was a one-week, school-based intervention called “Be 
Bike Smart” that promoted the safety benefit of helmet use and the consequences that 
occur when they are not used.333 Printed materials and oral presentations were delivered 
to students, while resources were provided to teachers for classroom exercises.334 
Students promoted helmet use to their peers during school assemblies and created posters 
advocating for helmet use.335 An Olympic cyclist visited and spoke to students about the 
importance of wearing a helmet.336 Parents received letters detailing the safety benefits 
of bicycle helmets along with presentations from the local hospital and a bicycle helmet 
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retailer.337 Helmets were offered for purchase at a 20 percent discount, and a limited 
number of additional five dollar rebates available for children in low-income schools.338  
Observers recorded group composition and location data along with basic helmet 
use statistics, enabling inference into the factors influencing helmet wearing.339 Peer 
influence was strong, as 70 percent of high-income and 67 percent of low-income 
children wore a helmet when another child in their group was helmeted.340 Parents also 
had an extremely significant effect, with 100 percent of high-income and 90 percent of 
low-income children wearing helmets when riding with a helmeted adult.341 The 
influence of teachers on helmet use varied significantly by income group, with high-
income schoolyard helmet use changing from 4 percent at baseline to 48 percent in 
intervention schools compared to control schools’ 5 percent to 34 percent change, while 
low-income’s intervention schools changed from 4 percent to 8 percent compared to 
control schools’ 3 percent to 14 percent improvement.342 
This intervention produced a lasting improvement in helmet use at the high-
income schools, but had no effect at low-income schools.343 Helmet use among students 
of the neighborhoods of high-income intervention schools increased from 4 percent at 
baseline to 36 percent post-treatment, a far greater improvement than the 4 percent to 15 
percent change in helmet use recorded in areas near high-income control schools.344 The 
“Be Bike Smart” intervention did not produce the same effect in low-income 
neighborhoods, however, where low-income treatment schools increased from 1 percent 
to 7 percent helmet use, and low-income control schools increased from 3 percent to 13 
percent.345 The disparity in outcome observed between children in high-income and low-
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income schools identifies these two groups as two distinct populations requiring separate 
analyses. 
2. Analysis of Case 5: Parkin et al. High-Income Children 
a. Outcome: Lasting Success 
A greater increase in bicycle helmet use was observed among high-income 
treatment schools relative to high-income control schools, a difference that persisted six 
months after the intervention.346 
b. Model 1 Analysis 
Injury threats and safety considerations altered the relative expected utilities of 
wearing a bicycle helmet and riding without, thereby causing helmeted wearing to 
become the optimal choice. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
Model 2 interprets the Lasting Success of the “Be Bike Smart” program as a 
function of methods that increased children’s’ intentions to wear helmets when riding 
bicycles, in possible conjunction with methods that removed barriers to helmeted riding. 
Intent may have been cultivated by injury threats that influenced attitudes about helmet 
behavior, or by injunctive pressure to wear a helmet that students perceived from their 
peers who promoted helmets in school assemblies, from their parents, from teachers in 
school, or from the Olympian guest speaker. Barriers to helmet wearing behavior were 
removed by the discounted sale of helmets in school, which may have mitigated financial 
or convenience hurdles. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
This intervention may have influenced affective, loss aversion, or social heuristics 
to achieve its Lasting Success. Explicit or implicit injury threats may have instilled an 
automatic, affective preference for helmeted riding behavior. The increase in bicycle 
                                                 
346 Ibid. 
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helmet use may also have occurred in response to the injury threats communicated by this 
treatment. Social heuristics may also have caused children to wear their helmets, either 
by way of injunctive pressure from peers, parents, teachers, celebrity, or through an 
intuitive desire to maintain consistency with public statements made while performing in 
school assemblies or creating pro-helmet posters. 
The presence of potential social explanations for the observed behavior change 
prevents inference regarding the status of optimism bias in this case. Without these social 
forces we could conclude that optimism bias had been successfully circumvented by this 
intervention in order to produce change through affect or loss aversion. With social 
heuristics available as vectors, however, we cannot know if program success was due to 
injury threats activating affect/loss aversion (with or without social heuristics in play), or 
if optimism bias did confound fear appeals, which would indicate that all change 
followed from social forces. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
Aspiration-level, one-reason, and social decision making strategies may have 
been influenced by the “Be Bike Smart” intervention to produce a lasting increase in 
helmet use. Injury threats may have caused children employing aspiration-level strategies 
to consider the option of helmeted riding prior to other satisficing alternatives, or fear 
appeals may have altered aspiration-level evaluations to either render helmetless riding 
unsatisfactory, or to raise helmeted riding above the satisficing level. One-reason 
decision makers may have raised safety concerns to the top of their differentiating cue 
priority list in response to the injury threats communicated by this intervention, or these 
same injury threats may have altered the weights of existing cues about safety or social 
acceptability cues, leading more riders to decide to wear helmets. Finally, injunctive 
pressure from peers, parents, teachers, or the celebrity cyclist may have swayed children. 
f. Coding of Case 5 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 5 is shown in Table 12. The reduced 
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array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 5 is displayed in Table 13. 
Table 12.   Parkin et al. High-Income Activated Factors of Individual Action 
Model 1 Expected 
Utility 
Injury Threat 
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3. Analysis of Case 6: Parkin et al. Low-Income Children 
a. Outcome: No Effect 
No significant difference in bicycle helmet use was detected between low-income 
treatment and control schools.347 
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b. Model 1 Analysis 
Expected Utility Theory explains that the intervention produced no effect in low-
income schools because helmetless riding remained the optimal choice for these children. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
The “Be Bike Smart” program attempted to increase helmet wearing behavior by 
enhancing intentions and removing environmental barriers. The lack of effect suggests 
that injury threats failed to instill positive attitudes about helmeted riding and the 
injunctive pressure from peers, parents, and the Olympian were ineffective, or the 20 
percent discount and limited five dollar rebates were inadequate to remove the 
environmental barrier (lack of helmet) that prevented some children from engaging in this 
behavior. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
The failure of this intervention to produce any effect may be understood through 
analysis of the intuitive heuristics that determine helmet behavior. Although the treatment 
attempted to leverage affect and loss aversion through injury threats, as well as social 
heuristics using injunctive pressure and public commitments, none of these factors 
produced behavior change. A possible explanation is that children’s optimism bias was 
activated in response to fear appeals, rendering these riders immune to influence. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
Heuristic aspiration-level, one-reason, and social decision making strategies were 
targeted unsuccessfully by the treatment condition. Despite threat of injury, children in 
the low-income schools may have continued to encounter the option of helmetless riding 
and evaluate it as satisfactory when using aspiration-level strategies. Riders may also 
have decided to ride helmetless after using a one-reason decision strategy, as a 
differentiating cue besides safety may have been encountered, or evaluation of the safety 
cue for these children may not have indicated helmeted riding. Finally, the injunctive 
pressure received from peers, parents, or the celebrity must have either failed to convince 
children to wear helmets, or possibly even encouraged them to ride without a helmet. 
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f. Coding of Case 6 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 6 is shown in Table 14. The reduced 
array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 6 is displayed in Table 15. 
 
Table 14.   Parkin et al. Low-Income Activated Factors of Individual Action 
Model 1 Expected 
Utility 
Injury Threat 
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E. LUDWIG ET AL. 
1. Description 
Ludwig et al. studied the effect of fear appeals, peer influence, and public 
commitments on bicycle helmet use.348 The intervention was performed on a U.S. 
college campus, with a similar college campus located several hours away serving as 
control.349 Helmet use was recorded by direct observation for three weeks of baseline 
data prior to initiating the treatment, and monitoring continued throughout the five week 
intervention and three week withdrawal period at both the experimental and control 
campuses.350 Additional follow-up helmet use data was obtained at the intervention 
campus only during weeks 32, 45, and 52.351 
Resources and volunteers were prepared in advance for the implementation of this 
study.352 A brochure featuring a colorful, student-designed logo was created prior to the 
study to describe the danger of head trauma and the ability of helmets to mitigate this 
risk.353 Stickers bearing the same logo were also produced in order to identify riders who 
had agreed to wear helmets when cycling.354 A group of 15 students who had been 
observed wearing helmets while riding were recruited as agents to deliver this 
intervention to their peers.355 
The intervention employed several methods to encourage bicycle helmet use. Peer 
agents interacted with individuals on campus whom they observed either riding without a 
helmet, or riding with a helmet that did not bear the intervention sticker.356 The 
volunteers provided a brochure, encouraged helmet safety, and asked subjects to commit 
                                                 
348 Ludwig, Buchholz, and Clarke, “Using Social Marketing to Increase the Use of Helmets Among 
Bicyclists,” 51. 
349 Ibid., 53. 
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to wearing a bicycle helmet by signing a pledge card and affixing the program sticker to 
their helmet.357 Any individual who signed the pledge card was given a coupon for a free 
helmet at the local bicycle shop.358 Upon redeeming a coupon for a free helmet, bicycle 
shop employees had been instructed to relate a personal story of injury to emphasize the 
importance of helmet wearing, and provide a free helmet bearing the program sticker.359 
As in Geller et al.’s 1985 study, the task of observation was segregated from that of 
reward distribution to avoid biased measurements.360 
A lasting increase in helmet use was observed on the intervention campus.361 
Helmet use at the treatment school began at 26.1 percent during baseline, reaching  
49.3 percent by the end of the intervention period, and remained at 44.4 percent at the 
end of the three week withdrawal period.362 Students signed 379 pledge cards and 
redeemed 242 coupons for free helmets at the bicycle shop.363 Long term follow-up 
revealed a 38.6 percent rate of helmet use at week 32, 52 percent at week 45, and  
33.2 percent at week 58.364 Helmet use at the control school did not change significantly, 
measuring 11.8 percent during baseline, 11.2 percent during intervention, and  
14.2 percent during the withdrawal period.365 
2. Analysis of Case 7: Ludwig et al. 
a. Outcome: Lasting Success 
This program is coded as a Lasting Success because elevated helmet use was not 
only maintained throughout the three week withdrawal immediately following treatment, 
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it was also observed 58 weeks later when one quarter of the student population had 
presumably been replaced by a new freshman class.366 
b. Model 1 Analysis 
Injury threats altered expected utility calculations for the options of cycling with 
and without a helmet such that helmeted riding was now the optimal choice. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
The lasting behavior change observed in this study may have been produced by 
encouraging helmet-wearing intent, or by removing barriers to this behavior. Intention to 
wear a helmet when riding may have been increased by injury threats that instilled a 
positive attitude towards helmet use, or by injunctive pressure from peer volunteers. 
Provision of free bicycle helmets may have removed barriers inhibiting some riders from 
performing this behavior. Although 64 percent of pledge-signing riders redeemed a free 
helmet, there is no data to establish that these helmets accounted for the increased rate of 
helmeted riding, and therefore we cannot know if this improvement was caused by 
changing intentions or by removing barriers.367 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
Multiple intuitive heuristics may explain the results observed in this study. The 
increased salience of helmet-wearing produced by the program sticker borne on 
participants’ helmets may have made helmeted riding behavior more available or primed 
riders to wear their helmets. Injury threats communicated by the brochure, the peer agent, 
or the bicycle shop employee may have instilled a positive affective response towards 
bicycle helmets, or these fear appeals might have activated a loss aversion response. 
Finally, social pressures from peer agents’ injunctive requests for individuals to ride 
helmeted, or from subjects’ intuitive desires to remain consistent with the public 
commitment to helmeted riding that they signed on the pledge card may have produced 
the increase in behavior. As in Parkin et al.’s high-income treatment condition, the 
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presence of availability/anchoring and social heuristics as alternatives to injury threats 
prevents any inference regarding the role of optimism bias in this case. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
This intervention may have increased bicycle helmet use by influencing the 
simplified aspiration-level, one-reason, or social decision making strategies employed by 
riders. Aspiration-level strategies may have been altered either by salience from peer 
agents and program stickers altering search order to encounter the option of wearing a 
helmet prior to other satisficing options, or by injury threats that changed the nature of 
helmetless riding so that it no longer reached the rider’s aspiration level. Injury threats 
may have also altered one-reason decision making strategies either by increasing the 
priority of safety cues for differentiation, or by altering the weight ascribed to the safety 
attribute for helmeted and helmetless riding to guide riders to choose helmeted riding. 
Finally, injunctive social pressure from peer agents, who as far as subjects knew were 
always present within the campus population, may have caused these riders to adopt 
helmet wearing. 
f. Coding of Case 7 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 7 is shown in Table 16. The reduced 
array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 7 is displayed in Table 17. 
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Table 16.   Ludwig et al. Activated Factors of Individual Action 
Model 1 Expected 
Utility 
Injury Threat 
      
















































Table 17.   Ludwig et al. Intervention Methods Correlated with Lasting Success 
Economic 
Incentive 
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F. WERCH ET AL. 
1. Description 
Werch et al. investigated the influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
student alcohol consumption.368 A sample of 634 participants were recruited from the 
first year class of a U.S. college and randomly assigned to the treatment or control 
conditions.369 Students in the treatment condition received a subjective norms-based 
intervention, while students in the control group were given the school’s standard 
prevention program.370 Baseline data on student alcohol use was obtained at the 
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beginning of the fall 1998 semester, and post-intervention use was recorded at the end of 
the spring 1999 semester.371 
The intervention consisted of a series of three greetings cards mailed to treatment 
students during the fall semester, and telephone call made to these same students during 
the spring.372 Greeting cards were sent shortly before Halloween, Thanksgiving, and 
winter break, holidays that are associated with increased drinking.373 Each card featured 
images of attractive students, descriptive information about the actual prevalence of 
student drinking on campus, and injunctive statements indicating that most disapprove of 
heavy drinking by their peers.374 Telephone calls placed by peers in the spring semester 
encouraged treatment subjects to avoid unhealthy drinking.375 
No effect on alcohol consumption was observed during the course of this 
study.376 Alcohol use indicators remained the same or worsened slightly from baseline to 
post-intervention for both the intervention and control groups.377 Follow-up surveys of 
the treatment group found that 84 percent of students recalled at least two of the greeting 
cards, and 80 percent of students thought that the phone calls were very effective or 
effective.378 
2. Analysis of Case 8: Werch et al. 
a. Outcome: No Effect 
No difference was observed between intervention and control groups.379 
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b. Model 1 Analysis 
Expected utility calculations were not influenced by this intervention, and 
therefore the treatment produced No Effect. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
This intervention attempted to moderate student drinking behavior through social 
factors. Descriptive norms of average student drinking habits were meant to correct 
subject’s misconceptions about the drinking behavior of their peers and inspire 
moderation through conformity. The spring semester telephone call from an unknown 
and anonymous peer was intended to exert an injunctive pressure to reduce alcohol 
consumption. Neither intervention method was successful. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
Availability, anchoring and social heuristics were targeted by this intervention. 
Salience from the greeting cards and telephone call had aimed to moderate drinking 
through the availability or anchoring heuristics. The social heuristics of herding, whereby 
individuals conform to the descriptive norm, and injunctive norms from anonymous peers 
were also intended to change drinking behavior. 
e. Model 4 Analysis 
Simplified aspiration-level and social decision making heuristics might have been 
activated by the methods of this intervention. Salience from the greetings cards and 
telephone call could have altered the search order of aspiration-level strategies to 
encounter the option of not drinking prior to other satisficing alternatives. Descriptive 
norms encouraged students to adopt an imitate-the-majority decision making strategy, 
while injunctive pressure communicated by an anonymous peer over the telephone was 
intended to produce conformity to authoritative direction. 
f. Coding of Case 8 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 8 is shown in Table 18. The reduced 
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array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 8 is displayed in Table 19. 
Table 18.   Werch et al. Activated Factors of Individual Action 
Model 1 Expected 
Utility 
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Table 19.   Werch et al. Intervention Methods Correlated with No Effect 
Economic 
Incentive 
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G. COLLINS ET AL. 
1. Description 
Collins et al. evaluated the influence of descriptive norms and public commitment 
on the alcohol consumption of college students.380 The study selected 100 participants 
from a psychology course who reported at least two occurrences of heavy drinking in the 
last month, and randomly assigned these subjects by gender to treatment or control 
                                                 
380 Susan E. Collins, Kate B. Carey, and Martin J. Sliwinski, “Mailed Personalized Normative 
Feedback as a Brief Intervention for at-Risk College Drinkers,” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 63, no. 5 
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groups.381 Measures of alcohol use, attitudes, and alcohol-related consequences were 
obtained at a baseline screening session, as well as six weeks and six months post-
intervention.382 
The intervention provided personalized normative feedback to influence the 
drinking habits of the experimental group.383 After completing baseline screening, 
members of the treatment group received a document describing the subject’s self-
reported alcohol use indicators, along with gender-specific descriptive norms of alcohol 
use on campus and nationwide.384 Definitions of the alcohol use metrics were included, 
but no analysis of the subject’s drinking habits relative to the norm were provided.385 
Students in the control condition received a brochure containing educational information 
about alcohol use.386 
Only short-term effects were produced by the treatment condition.387 Alcohol 
consumption by students receiving the treatment was reduced significantly relative to that 
of control students at a six week follow-up assessment, but after six months the alcohol 
use of both groups returned to levels near baseline.388 Of the original 100 subjects, 95 
participated in baseline screening, 94 provided six week alcohol use data, and 65 
answered the six month follow-up.389 
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2. Analysis of Case 9: Collins et al. 
a. Outcome: Temporary Success 
The treatment group reported healthier alcohol use practices at six weeks post-
intervention compared to the control group, but treatment alcohol use indicators returned 
to baseline at six month follow up.390 
b. Model 1 Analysis 
Some aspect of this intervention must have altered expected utility calculations 
temporarily to optimize the choice of drinking less in the short-term following treatment. 
c. Model 2 Analysis 
The IMBP explains the temporary reduction in alcohol use by the intervention 
group as an attempt to conform to descriptive norms of the alcohol use of a typical 
student. 
d. Model 3 Analysis 
This intervention used a single, brief instance of personalized normative feedback 
to influence drinking behavior by leveraging availability, anchoring, and social heuristics. 
The intervention was intended to be brief but highly salient so as to make moderate 
drinking behavior more available to students’ minds, or to prime them to consider 
controlled alcohol use. Socially, this intervention could have altered behavior through 
descriptive norms to produce a herding effect, and by leveraging an individual’s intuitive 
desire to maintain consistency with their perceived public image as a normal drinker. The 
disparity between the students’ own heavy drinking behavior and that of the average 
student might have produced dissonance that motivated the student to change their 
behavior. 
                                                 
390 Ibid., 565. 
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e. Model 4 Analysis 
Simplified aspiration-level and social decision making heuristics explain the 
Temporary Success of this program. Salience from the brief yet significant intervention 
altered the search order of aspiration-level strategies to encounter the option of not 
drinking prior to other satisficing alternatives. Descriptive norms of average student 
alcohol use might also have moderated drinking by guiding students to adopt  an imitate-
the-majority strategy when making drinking decisions. 
f. Coding of Case 9 Data Structures 
The matrix describing the intervention methods and activated factors of individual 
action that are correlated with the outcome of Case 9 is shown in Table 20. The reduced 
array of independent variables representing the intervention methods correlated with the 
outcome of Case 9 is displayed in Table 21. 
Table 20.   Collins et al. Activated Factors of Individual Action 
Model 1 Expected 
Utility 
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This chapter analyzed nine cases that were derived from seven studies of public 
health and safety interventions. Each case was analyzed using a four-model approach to 
produce a matrix of intervention methods and activated factors of choice or behavior. The 
resulting matrices were then reduced to arrays of intervention methods that are correlated 
with the program outcome for each case. The elements of these arrays are independent 
variables that represent the intervention methods encountered during the nine case 
analyses: economic incentives, injury threats, salience, descriptive social norms, 
injunctive social norms, public commitments, and barrier removals. These independent 
variable arrays are the data that serve as input to the comparative analysis conducted in 
the following chapter. Table 22 displays the arrays of intervention methods correlated 
with program outcome for all cases on a single page, organized by outcome, to facilitate 
productive comparative analysis through visual recognition of patterns and detection of 




Table 22.   Intervention Methods Correlated with Program Outcome for all Cases 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter conducts a comparative analysis between the arrays of independent 
variables generated from each case in Chapter IV in order to identify methods that are 
correlated with the success of public health and safety interventions in general. Discovery 
of a set of methods correlated with program success could guide the design of new 
interventions and suggest future experimentally designed research studies to establish the 
causality of these methods. Before delving into the full comparative analysis, the first 
section of this chapter attempts a simplified, integrative approach to analyze the 
independent variable arrays. This initial technique proves inadequate, however, thereby 
demonstrating the necessity of the comparative analysis research design. The second 
section conducts the formal comparative analysis by examining the three classes of 
pairings defined in Chapter III. The comparative analysis process uses pairs of 
independent variable arrays that represent the nine cases to selectively control for the 
influence of certain variables, thereby permitting inference of those methods that are 
correlated with success across the entire selection of cases examined by this thesis. A 
summary section follows these two analysis techniques to review the progress of this 
thesis at the completion of the comparative analysis. 
A. INTEGRATION OF CORRELATED INTERVENTION METHODS 
A straightforward integration of potentially influential methods by program 
outcome constitutes a first attempt towards understanding the mechanisms behind the 
success or failure of health and safety interventions. The intervention method arrays 
generated from analysis of the individual cases are grouped according to outcome, and 
within each group the intervention method arrays are then combined to produce a new 
array that represents the methods that are correlated with that group outcome across all 
selected cases. The number of cases employing a particular method within each group are 
enumerated to obtain a possible indication of the correlational strength between that 
method and the group outcome. This integrative analysis weights all cases equally when 
tallying instances of method use, though an unequal case weighting based on sample size 
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or some other indicator of significance would represent another valid approach. The 
number of instances that each intervention method was correlated with Lasting Success 
are described by Table 23, the number of instances that each method was correlated with 
Temporary Success are represented by Table 24, and the number of instances that each 
method was correlated with No Effect are shown in Table 25. 
Table 23.   Instances of Intervention Methods Correlated with Lasting Success 
Economic 
Incentive 








1 2 1 0 3 2 2 
 
Table 24.   Instances of Intervention Methods Correlated with Temporary Success 
Economic 
Incentive 








1 0 2 1 1 2 0 
 
Table 25.   Instances of Intervention Methods Correlated with No Effect 
Economic 
Incentive 








0 2 2 1 2 1 1 
 
Analysis of the integrated sets of methods that are correlated with each outcome 
does not yield useful insights into the factors that contribute to program success. Cursory 
examination of these sets reveals that each intervention method is correlated with at least 
two different outcomes, and many methods are in fact associated with all three of the 
outcomes encountered in this thesis. The only inference that may be drawn from these 
results is that the factors that produce a successful health and safety intervention cannot 
be reduced down to the mere presence or absence of a universal method, but will instead 
require a more involved analysis to understand the reasons why change programs succeed 
or fail. 
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B. CONDUCTING THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A comparative analysis of the individual cases examined in this study will permit 
a more nuanced investigation of the methods that contribute to a successful health and 
safety intervention. This analysis will adhere to the methodology defined in Chapter III in 
order to produce reliable and credible results. Three classes of comparisons were defined 
in the methodology of this comparative case study, with each class guiding case pair 
selection and providing a detailed process by which to isolate variables from the sets of 
intervention methods correlated with each case outcome to infer a set of intervention 
methods that are correlated with successful public health and safety programs in general. 
1. Identical Outcomes, Different Methods 
Identifying common methods used by health and safety interventions to achieve 
Lasting Success cannot establish the causality of these shared methods, but may guide 
later analysis when pairs of cases that produce different outcomes are compared. 
Examination of the intervention methods acting upon Rudd and Geller’s students 
alongside the methods influencing Parkin et al.’s high-income children reveals that both 
cases employed injunctive pressure as part of their recipes for Lasting Success. These 
injunctive forces were exerted by police towards Rudd and Geller’s students, and by 
some combination of peers, teachers, parents, and celebrity towards Parkin et al.’s high-
income children. Relating the factors influencing Rudd and Geller’s students to those of 
Ludwig et al.’s study again finds that injunctive pressure may have played a role in 
producing Lasting Success through social forces originating from police in Rudd and 
Geller’s case and from peers under the Ludwig et al. intervention. This finding of 
injunctive pressure as a common correlated factor in two pairings of successful health 
and safety interventions suggests that the role of this variable should be scrutinized in 
subsequent comparisons. 
An examination of the cases resulting in Temporary Success suggests that 
economic incentives will only change behavior as long as individuals are rewarded. 
Drivers in the contingent lot of Geller et al.’s study wore seat belts at an increased rate 
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until they realized they would no longer be paid to do so.391 Comparison among the three 
Temporary Success cases is unable to offer additional insights regarding singular 
methods associated with this outcome, however, because all pairings involve either two 
shared methods or none. 
2. Similar Methods, Different Outcomes 
Comparative analysis of cases with different outcomes may provide insight into 
the methods that determine program success. Synthesizing the inferences produced by 
this series of case comparisons may allow observations to build upon each other to gain 
further understanding of the mechanisms that drive change. 
Analyzing Rudd and Geller’s students in conjunction with Geller et al.’s 
contingent lot drivers reveals the power of injunctive pressure to produce lasting health 
and safety improvements. Both groups were exposed to economic incentives, suggesting 
that the influence of rewards on program outcome was controlled for in this comparison, 
and therefore could not have caused the difference between Rudd and Geller’s Lasting 
Success and Geller et al.’s Temporary Success. This inference is further bolstered by the 
observation from Geller et al. that economic incentives are unable to produce Lasting 
Success.392 With economic incentives controlled or discounted and only one other 
intervention remaining that could have influenced Rudd and Geller’s students, we can 
infer that injunctive pressure from campus police must have been responsible for the 
lasting increase in student, faculty, and staff seat belt use. 
Descriptive norms and salience were employed by both Werch et al. and Collins 
et al., suggesting that the variation in program outcome must have been caused instead by 
the methods on which these interventions differed. Werch et al. applied injunctive 
pressure via a single telephone call from an anonymous student but did not produce any 
effect on the treatment group.393 Collins et al. achieved Temporary Success by leveraging 
                                                 
391 Geller, Paterson, and Talbott, “A Behavioral Analysis of Incentive Prompts for Motivating Seat 
Belt Use,” 403. 
392 Ibid., 412. 
393 Werch et al., “Results of a Social Norm Intervention to Prevent Binge Drinking among First-Year 
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subjects’ commitments to their perceived public images through dissonance-producing 
personalized normative feedback.394 This comparison reveals that some sources of 
injunctive pressure are insufficient to effect any change, and that commitment to 
individuals’ perceived public images can motivate at least a temporary change. 
The set of possible methods that explain Ludwig et al.’s Lasting Success can be 
reduced to injunctive pressure from peers, public commitment, and barrier removal. 
Although Ludwig et al.’s intervention employed five methods, the role of injury threats 
and salience can be ruled out for two reasons. The first reason is that the Robertson et al. 
findings alone indicate that salient injury threats produce no effect.395 Secondly, the 
influence of injury threats and salience on Ludwig et al.’s outcome are controlled by 
comparison to Robertson et al.’s array of independent variables, therefore indicating that 
the difference between Ludwig et al.’s Lasting Success and Robertson et al.’s No Effect 
must be due to variation on the uncontrolled variables. 
Comparing Ludwig et al. with Rudd and Geller’s campus police raises questions 
about the nature of the injunctive pressures and public commitments that are successful in 
improving health and safety. After comparing Ludgwig et al. to Robertson et al., the set 
of possible intervention methods that could explain the Lasting Success of Ludwig et al. 
were reduced to injunctive pressure from peers, public commitment from pledge cards 
and program stickers affixed on helmets, and barrier removal with free helmet coupons. 
When the intervention methods acting upon Rudd and Geller’s police are compared to the 
reduced set of methods from Ludwig et al., the shared presence of injunctive pressure and 
public commitments in both cases should then control for the influence of these variables 
on program outcome. This would suggest that barrier removal, Ludwig et al.’s sole 
remaining uncontrolled method, must have been responsible for the Lasting Success 
achieved in this case as opposed to the Temporary Success produced with Rudd and 
Geller’s police. Review of the Rudd and Geller study, however, indicates that there were 
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no environmental barriers preventing police from buckling up.396 This suggests that 
barrier removals could not be responsible for the difference between Ludwig et al.’s 
Lasting Success and Rudd and Geller’s Temporary Success, a realization which casts 
doubt on the previous assumption that the influence of injunctive pressure and public 
commitments on program outcome were controlled for by the comparison of these two 
cases. 
The injunctive pressures and public commitments applied to Ludwig et al.’s 
students must be different in some way from those experienced by Rudd and Geller’s 
police if the comparison of these cases did not control for the influence of these methods 
on program outcome. The lasting increase in bicycle helmet use among students in 
Ludwig et al. was motivated by injunctive pressure from other peer cyclists and by 
participants’ public commitments to maintain consistency with signed pledge cards and 
program stickers affixed to their helmets. Rudd and Geller’s campus police temporarily 
increased their seat belt use in response to injunctive pressure from researchers and an 
implicit public commitment to buckle up when recording the license plate numbers of 
other belted drivers for entry in the sweepstakes raffle. While Ludwig et al. maintained a 
persistent influence by instilling participants with the perception that the population of 
helmeted bicycle riding peers on campus concealed peer agents who would judge 
helmetless riders negatively (especially if the participant were recognized as pledge-
breakers), Geller et al.’s intervention ceased to exert any social influence on campus 
police once their interactions with researchers ended and police no longer monitored the 
public’s seat belt use. This distinction implies that injunctive pressure and public 
commitments are powerful tools for change, but only while the sources exerting these 
social forces are perceived to be present. 
Returning to Collins et al. with the newfound understanding that public 
commitments only produce change while an individual perceives dissonance in their 
actions allows for a satisfactory explanation of the temporary results achieved by this 
intervention. The earlier comparison of Collins et al. with Werch et al. established that a 
                                                 
396 Rudd and Geller, “A University-Based Incentive Program to Increase Safety Belt Use.” 
 103 
subject’s commitment to maintaining consistency with their perceived public image was 
wholly responsible for a temporary improvement in drinking habits. This result is now 
unsurprising and offers additional support for the finding that public commitments are 
effective methods achieving change in health and safety that will persist as long as 
subjects continue to perceive dissonance between their commitments and their actions.  
The necessity of presence for the successful application of injunctive pressure is 
further demonstrated by comparing the different outcomes observed among Rudd and 
Geller’s student, faculty, and staff population compared to that of the campus police in 
their study. As previously established, the lasting change in seat belt use among Rudd and 
Geller’s student, faculty, and staff population was produced solely by injunctive pressure 
perceived from campus police monitoring of seat belt use. This result aligns with the 
findings of previous comparisons, as elevated seat belt compliance is expected to persist 
while the ever-present campus police continue to exert injunctive pressure. The failure of 
injunctive pressure originating from researchers to achieve lasting change in campus 
police seat belt use is explained by the close of the study and the end of scrutiny 
perceived by the police. 
3. Identical Methods 
Analyzing a pair of cases that employed identical sets of intervention methods can 
increase confidence in findings when both cases produce the same outcome, or can 
identify possible errors in coding or issues with research design when inconsistent 
outcomes are generated. The comparative analysis of Parkin et al.’s high-income and 
low-income children falls into the latter category, with the case codebook defined in 
Chapter IV guiding identical coding of the independent variables that represent the 
intervention methods used in each case, a problematic result given the different outcomes 
produced from these same inputs. A reassessment of the Parkin et al. intervention did not 
identify a failure to adhere to coding methodology, nor was this effort capable of locating 
additional factors of individual action missed by the four models of analysis, indicating a 
possible issue with research design. 
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The inconsistency detected in the comparative analysis of Parkin et al.’s high-
income and low-income children reveals that the independent variables representing 
intervention methods in this thesis are unable to fully express the particulars of some 
cases. Parkin et al. found greater helmet use in high-income treatment schoolyards 
compared to high-income control schoolyards, but did not detect a difference in helmet 
use between treatment and control schoolyards in low-income areas.397 These findings 
suggest that teachers in high-income areas exerted effective injunctive pressure that 
caused students more students to wear their helmets, while teachers in low-income 
schools did not influence children’s helmet use. If injunctive pressure had been 
represented by an independent variable for each source, then the high-income and low-
income children would differ only on the variable of injunctive pressure from teachers. A 
comparative analysis of these cases would control for the influence of all intervention 
methods except for injunctive pressure from teachers, thereby indicating that the success 
in Parkin et al.’s high-income schools was due to the addition of this influence. 
This lack of granularity in the variables representing intervention methods may be 
unavoidable. If the independent variables were expanded to capture a greater degree of 
detail, then the ability to draw inferences from case comparisons would be reduced. With 
more specific intervention method variables, fewer shared methods would be present 
among case pairs, greatly limiting the ability to control for the influence of these methods 
on intervention outcomes. This would make identification of the intervention methods 
correlated with success across the selection of cases examined by this thesis more 
challenging, if not impossible. These conflicting needs for both specificity and generality 
in coding intervention methods demonstrate the strength of qualitative analysis to resolve 
inconsistencies, as well as the need to collect and retain sufficient data to permit such 
analysis. 
Not only does the more detailed comparative analysis of Parkin et al. suggest that 
injunctive pressure contributed to success in the high-income case, it also raises further 
questions about the nature of effective injunctive pressure. Parkin et al. found that far 
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fewer children rode their bicycles to school in low-income areas compared to high-
income neighborhoods.398 Comparative analyses of previous cases have suggested that 
injunctive pressure is effective as long as a source is perceived to be present and exerting 
this force. It is unclear from these findings, however, if the failure to produce change in 
Parkin et al.’s low-income case was caused by a lack of presence due to the relatively low 
number of children who rode to school in low-income neighborhoods, or if there was 
something different about the nature of either the teachers or the children in the low-
income case that prevented injunctive pressure from having an effect. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter conducted a comparative analysis between the intervention methods 
employed by each case in order to identify methods that are correlated with program 
success across the selection of cases examined in this thesis. The first section established 
the need for analyzing pairs of cases, while the second section conducted these 
comparisons and found a limited number of intervention methods correlated with success. 
Although these findings are correlational and not causal, they do permit conclusions and 
recommendations that may improve public health and safety. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis constitutes a search for methods that may be used to design and 
implement successful public health and safety interventions. This investigation was 
initially motivated by a desire to improve the smoke alarm interventions of fire and life 
safety education. While reviewing studies of smoke alarm programs, it became apparent 
that fire and life safety education practitioners did not adequately understand how to 
influence individuals to install and maintain these crucial lifesaving devices.399 This 
problem was not limited to fire and life safety education, however, as other fields of 
unintentional injury prevention were found to be similarly uncertain of the determinant 
factors that cause individuals to perform recommended health and safety actions.400 
Further complicating this pursuit was a lack of reliable, longitudinal data describing fire 
and life safety education interventions.401 
A comparative case study research design was employed to identify intervention 
methods that are correlated with successful public health and safety programs. Before any 
cases could be analyzed to identify potentially influential methods, however, this thesis 
first had to develop a model of individual action that was capable of capturing the factors 
that might cause individuals to perform health and safety practices. A review of the 
literature on rational choice, reasoned behavior, and behavioral economics suggested four 
models of individual action: rational decision making among alternatives, reasoned 
behavior in isolation, nonrational behavior in isolation, and nonrational decision making 
among alternatives. Armed with this multi-model approach, a selection of cases were 
analyzed to interpret which intervention methods might have acted upon individuals to 
produce the associated case outcome. Due to the lack of reliable data in fire and life 
safety education, these cases were drawn from interventions targeting seat belts, bicycle 
helmets, and alcohol consumption. Comparative analysis between the sets of methods 
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used in each case allowed for inference of the methods that were correlated with success 
across the entire selection of cases examined in this thesis. The findings of this 
comparative case study permit conclusions and support recommendations that may 
enhance public health and safety. 
A. FINDINGS 
1. Models of Individual Action 
The literature on rational choice, reasoned behavior, and behavioral economics 
informed development of the four models of analysis that were used to detect the 
intervention methods employed by each case. The established field of rational choice 
featured Expected Utility Theory, which provided this thesis with a model of rational 
decision making among alternatives.402 Reasoned behavior is a field moving towards 
convergence, with the Integrative Model of Behavioral Prediction purported to be a 
generalized model that represents reasoned behavior in isolation.403 The emerging field 
of behavioral economics offered two perspectives from which to derive models of 
individual action. The first is the heuristics and biases program, which considers 
heuristics to be the source of errors which prevent humans from achieving optimal 
results.404 The fast and frugal heuristics program, on the other hand, asserts that 
individuals intentionally use simplified, heuristic strategies to achieve satisfactory results 
with little effort.405 Discussion within the behavioral economics literature was largely 
concerned with establishing definitions of rationality and classifying heuristics as 
products of either intuitive system 1 or reflective system 2 cognitive processes.406 
Although the interpretation of individual action as either behavior or choice was largely 
ignored by this literature, the heuristics and biases program implied a model of 
nonrational behavior in isolation, while the fast and frugal heuristics program suggested a 
model of nonrational decision making among alternatives. This four-model approach to 
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analysis was intentionally designed to detect a wide range of intervention methods 
correlated with each program outcome. 
2. Strengths of the Comparative Case Study Research Design 
The comparative case study proved to be a powerful research design. It permitted 
the discovery of a refined set of methods correlated with successful health and safety 
interventions across the selection of cases included in this thesis. Additionally, the 
comparative case study facilitated the development of hypotheses regarding the causality 
of relationships between the independent and dependent variables identified by this 
thesis.407 The intervention methods found to be correlated with success in general can be 
used without definitive evidence to plan future health and safety interventions, and may 
also inform hypotheses of causality to be tested in experimentally designed research 
studies. 
3. Insight through Qualitative Analysis 
Qualitative analysis was revealed as a robust method capable of supporting 
multiple perspectives for increased insight. When the simplified mapping from matrices 
of intervention methods and activated factors of individual action to arrays of Boolean  
values representing intervention methods was stymied by the comparative analysis of 
Parkin et al.’s high-income and low-income cases, a return to the raw qualitative analysis 
data permitted a more nuanced inspection of the differences between the intervention 
methods acting upon these two population groups. Not only did reexamination of the 
details of the Parkin et al. study raise questions about the nature of effective injunctive 
pressure, the opportunity to reconsider the Boolean simplifications that were intended to 
facilitate control and isolation of independent variables demonstrated the importance of 
preserving qualitative data. 
                                                 




Finally, the intervention methods found to be correlated with successful health 
and safety programs across the selection of cases examined in this thesis provided 
evidence for the efficacy of several intervention methods to influence individuals, while 
other methods were shown to have limited or no effect. Injunctive pressure produced 
changes in individuals’ actions that persisted while the sources of those pressures were 
perceived to be present, but ceased when those sources were removed. Public 
commitments combined with the continued presence of pledge reminders contributed to a 
lasting improvement in safety, while a single, brief introduction of dissonance in self-
image caused individuals to temporarily engage in healthier actions to restore consistency 
with their perceived public image. Economic incentives did influence individuals to 
change their actions, but these changes persisted only as long as individuals were 
rewarded for their performance. Salient injury threats did not have any effect on subjects’ 
actions. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Methods of Influence 
The results of this study permit several informative conclusions regarding the 
methods that can be used to influence individuals. Injunctive pressure is a highly 
effective tool for producing change, provided that individuals believe they are liable to be 
judged negatively if they do not perform desired actions. Public commitments are also a 
viable means of achieving at least a temporary improvement in health and safety, but 
individuals may have to be occasionally reminded of these commitments to maintain 
compliance. The impact of these two methods reveals the power that social forces possess 
to guide the actions of individuals. 
The findings of this comparative case study also inform conclusions about those 
methods that are not useful for improving individuals’ health and safety actions. The use 
of economic incentives is not a sustainable method for producing widespread change, as 
the number of individuals who would have to be perpetually rewarded would render the 
costs impractical. This conclusion receives additional support from a review of multiple 
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bicycle helmet interventions, which also found that safety gains are lost when extrinsic 
rewards are removed.408 Another conclusion of the present research is that salient injury 
threats are incapable of influencing individuals, possibly because the salience of these 
threats activates optimism bias, which then overrides any effects that might be produced 
by a change in attitudes and affect, or a reaction motivated by loss aversion. This 
conclusion only applies to the conjunction of salience with injury threats, however, as the 
findings of this research do not permit conclusions regarding the impact of salience or 
injury threats alone. It remains possible that non-salient injury threats might produce 
change, perhaps by subtly altering a subject’s attitudes or activating an affective or loss 
averse response without triggering optimism bias. 
2. Future Research 
Future research could both hone and extend the conclusions reached in this study. 
Using the methodology defined in Chapter III, additional interventions may be analyzed 
and compared against this initial set of cases to test the conclusions reached herein and 
possibly reveal additional inferences regarding influential intervention methods. Such 
further analysis might discover if the power of injunctive pressure varies based on the 
identity of its source, or if injunctive pressure from any source is equally effective 
provided it is perceived as present. Analysis of additional cases could also explore if 
public commitments are capable of producing a lasting health and safety improvement 
without injunctive pressure. The effect of subtle, non-salient injury threats could also be 
determined if an appropriate intervention employing this method can be found. Finally, 
experimental research studies that employ treatment and control groups could evaluate 
the effect of the intervention methods found by this thesis to be correlated with success, 
thereby providing conclusive evidence that these methods are indeed causal factors of 
effective public health and safety interventions. 
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3. Ethical Considerations 
Despite the potential to enhance public health and safety, the prospective use of 
public commitments and injunctive pressure to influence or nudge individuals does raise 
serious ethical questions. While some have argued that transparency regarding the intent 
and methods of a nudge renders it acceptable and non-manipulative, the classification of 
public commitments as transparent by these authors is not sufficiently reassuring.409 A 
progression of public commitments was reportedly used in Chinese prison camps during 
the Korean War to subtly twist American prisoners of war to collaborate and inform on 
their compatriots.410 This intervention worked by encouraging subjects to agree with 
seemingly innocuous statements criticizing the United States, sources of dissonance that 
then caused these individuals to alter their thoughts and actions to achieve consistency 
with these statements.411 The use of injunctive pressure appears similarly troubling, as 
the motivation and means of influence behind this social force may not be readily 
apparent to its recipients. With public commitments used in prison camp conditioning, 
and the proposed campaign of injunctive pressure eerily reminiscent of a modern-day 
panopticon, health and safety practitioners must exercise the utmost caution to ensure that 
any use of these methods is responsible and controlled. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Achieving widespread change in individual-level health and safety is an ambitious 
and challenging goal. Obvious injury threats are ineffective even when they are made 
implicitly by promoting desired actions as a means of reducing health and safety risks. 
Rewarding every member of the public indefinitely in order to incentivize beneficial 
health and safety actions is not economically feasible. It is also not possible for health 
and safety practitioners to maintain a sufficient surveillance presence to exert the 
necessary injunctive pressure on the entire public to elicit widespread compliance with 
recommended practices, nor is it practical for these practitioners to secure commitment 
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pledges from every individual within the population. Through deliberate and targeted 
interventions, however, health and safety practitioners may be able to initiate a social 
reaction that spreads far beyond the limited reach of direct practitioner influence. 
1. An Exponential Method of Influence 
Practitioners should mount focused interventions that light a fire within the public 
for health and safety by crowd-sourcing injunctive pressure and public commitments. 
Limited, practitioner-implemented interventions could exert injunctive pressure and 
obtain public commitments from incentivized or volunteer peer agents, who would then 
be directed to pressure their neighbors, friends, and family to perform desired health or 
safety actions and secure pledges committing to those practices. Peer agents would 
pressure these individuals to encourage others to act in a healthy or safe manner, while 
also obtaining public commitments from these second-order subjects. To prevent the 
influence of public commitments from waning as in Collins et al., pledges should be 
constant fixtures that are advertised as widely as possible, perhaps by encouraging 
individuals to share these statements via social media. 
2. Crowd-Sourcing Smoke Alarm Advocacy and Enforcement 
Effective smoke alarm interventions might be designed by adhering to the 
preceding description of a public-driven health and safety campaign. Injunctive pressure 
and public commitments would be the core methods of this intervention, but practitioners 
should not attempt to exert these forces on the public at large. Rather, the extent of the 
practitioner’s role in encouraging smoke alarm installation and maintenance would be to 
indoctrinate a limited number of peer agents dispersed throughout each community. It is 
these peer agents who would be responsible for applying injunctive pressure and 
obtaining public commitments from the majority in order to encourage widespread smoke 
alarm compliance. Members of local fire departments may be well positioned to fulfill 
the role of practitioners, as they are capable of reaching a diverse, distributed collection 
of peer agents throughout their jurisdictions. 
Practitioners from local fire departments could cultivate a cadre of peer agents 
through public commitments and the judicious use of injunctive pressure to elicit 
 114 
compliance with pledges. Public commitments are an ideal intervention method because 
they are a relatively cheap foot-in-the-door technique that can be applied to numerous 
potential peer agents without concern for wasted program resources should some of these 
individuals not respond as desired. Members of local fire departments could seek peer 
agents under the guise of door to door smoke alarm inspections. Occupants found to be in 
compliance with recommended smoke alarm standards should be considered for 
recruitment as peer agents. At no point should practitioners attempt to change attitudes or 
activate fear appeals through discussion about the safety benefits of smoke alarms or the 
repercussions for their absence, as these methods were previously found to be ineffective. 
Instead, practitioners should congratulate compliant residents on their responsible smoke 
alarm practices and ask these individuals to make a public commitment to maintain this 
level of smoke alarm protection in their own household, and to also pledge to help those 
around them accomplish the same. These commitments should be shared as widely as 
possible, using social media statements, signs displayed on lawns or front doors, and 
distribution of emails to family, friends, and coworkers. These seemingly innocuous 
pledges should cause peer agents to perceive injunctive pressure to uphold these vows 
from the fire department members who recruited them, as well as from family, friends, 
coworkers, and social media contacts who observed this public commitment. 
Infrequent and seemingly random follow-up visits to peer agents should be 
performed to encourage consistency with public commitments, and to provide 
practitioners with an opportunity to launch the second phase of this intervention. The 
random nature of these visits should make the initial set of peer agents perceive 
injunctive pressure from the previously complimentary local fire department recruiters, 
who might appear at any time and judge these occupants poorly if their smoke alarm 
coverage is found to be inadequate on a follow up visit. This delay between initial 
recruitment and follow-up would also allow time for peer agents to influence other 
second-order subjects within their social circles to comply with recommended smoke 
alarm standards. During follow-up visits, practitioners should ask initial peer agents to 
make another public commitment, this time pledging to ask their second-order subjects to 
make their own public commitments to maintain adequate smoke alarm coverage and to 
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also agree to help others attain proper smoke alarm coverage. If successful, this second 
stage of the intervention would generate an explosive growth in the number of peer 
agents working towards achieving complete smoke alarm protection. 
Practitioners should continue to perform follow-up visits that apply targeted 
pressure on the original set of peer agents in order to sustain the influence of this 
intervention. These visits should exert injunctive pressure on peer agents to remain 
consistent with their public commitment to maintain adequate smoke alarm coverage 
within their household, and to uphold their pledge to obtain similar public commitments 
from others. By engaging the public in smoke alarm advocacy, this intervention may 
succeed in achieving the goal of full compliance with smoke alarm protection 
recommendations. 
3. Summary 
The conclusions of this comparative case study indicate that a lasting 
improvement in smoke alarm compliance, or in any other public health and safety 
practice, may be attained provided that individuals remember their public commitments 
and perceive themselves to be recipients of injunctive pressure. If the intervention 
described above is successful in making the first and second-order subjects commit to 
and feel pressure to maintain adequate smoke alarm protection while eliciting the same 
from others, then this process should become self-sustaining. Admittedly, any 
intervention of this type would initially influence only a relatively small number of 
individuals. By kindling a flame of civic engagement, however, the resulting chain 
reaction could propagate an exponential, public-driven improvement in health and safety. 
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